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Executive Summary  
The aim of this report is to describe and analyze the embodiment of acceptance and recognition in 
discourses and practices which address cultural diversity in the Swedish educational system. In order 
to fulfil this general aim, we study how different categories of practitioners in the Swedish school 
system, such as teachers, headmasters and union representatives, and other stakeholders, such as civil 
servants, and representatives of political parties and the civil society, discuss and relate to the claims 
of recognition put forth by Muslim practitioners and/or policy measures designed to reach the 
fulfilment of those claims. Two cases are studied: the establishment of Muslim independent schools 
and the claims to dress veiled in public schools, out forth by Muslim youth.  
The cases are selected with consideration to a number of circumstances. First, the faith and belief 
practices of Muslim migrants have been debated on a large scale in Swedish media during the last 
decade, as in many other West European and North American countries. It is quite common that these 
practices has been put under scrutiny, and subjected to extensive critique. The attention paid to 
Muslim belief practices and institutions has also reached Muslim denominational schools and the 
practice of Burqa and Niqab. The establishment of denominational schools during the last two 
decades, whether Islamic or not, has also received a lot of attention, in mainstream media as well as in 
debates on education policy. For instance, a number of political parties have voiced demands to keep 
down the number of Islamic denominational schools.  
Second, Muslim migrants has, according to a number of studies, been subjected to direct and indirect 
discrimination. Whether this discrimination primarily is religious to its nature, or ethnic, and hence 
targeting their ethnic identity, is not always concluded, but the extensive negative attention mentioned 
above suggests that the scope of religiously motivated discrimination is either predominant or on the 
rise. The enactment of Muslim belief practices is not infrequently obstructed. For example, the 
construction of Mosques does seldom take place in silence; frequent and high-pitched voices of 
rejection and disapproval are common, and when the buildings once are completed, the congregations 
receive numerous threats and insults. The opposition is evident, and two mosques have been burned 
down. Moreover, women wearing burqa or niqab report being harassed in public. Apart from the lack 
of recognition and acceptance in religious matters, the prevalence of discriminatory mechanisms might 
also obstruct the access to welfare services and the entry to the labour market.  
This report consists of two cases studies, which relies solely on qualitative data. The main part of the 
empirical material consists of interviews with 13 persons – three teachers, three headmasters, two 
union representatives, two civil servants, one jurist, one imam and one representative of a political 
party. The interviews are used as a source for both cases. As additions to interviews, we have collected 
newspaper articles, memos from public authorities, bills introduced to the parliament, debates on 
commentary fields in web-edition of newspapers, et cetera. Being a minor study, it is necessary to 
make some reservations concerning the reliability of our material. Thus, it is difficult to determine 
whether or not it is possible to make generalizations from our material, thus asserting that the 
viewpoints found in our material are overlapping with or similar to the attitudes of other teachers, 
headmasters et cetera.  
In sum, a number of disadvantages with the establishment of Islamic denominational schools are 
expressed. They are allegedly divisive, both culturally and socially, and the quality of their 
instructions is supposed to be inadequate, in relation to the standards explicated in the national 
curriculum and syllabi. If the attitudes found in this study is spread all over Sweden, it could 
reasonable be said that Muslim schools are met by suspicion. Still, few calls for shutting down of these 
schools are voiced. It seems that the Muslim denominational schools are tolerated in a literal sense: it 
is accepted, sometimes pragmatically, but not liked. On the other hand, it could be said that the 
provision of a juridical and institutional space for religious minorities to establish denominational 
  
schools is part of politics of recognition; i.e. an educational policy which, under auspicious 
circumstances might provide the means for religious minorities to receive respect as equal and gain 
admission as normal.  
It must also be noted that the some of the objections to the existence of denominational schools 
implicitly and explicitly related to some central notions in Swedish educational policy. The notion of 
equivalence is a keyword in this context, and signifies on the one hand a demand for abidance by the 
national curriculum and syllabi, and on the other a priority of equalizing measures over freedom of 
choice. The equalizing and integrative objectives of the compulsory school project seem to be vital,  
but the quest for recognition of minority beliefs systems is circumscribed. Thus, the reproduction of 
“demos” is given priority over the recognition of “ethnos”. As such, the notion of “equivalence” 
[likvärdighet] has been a keyword in Swedish educational policy since the 1980’s, denoting equalizing 
ambitions as well as educational uniformity and compliance to steering documents.  
A number of objections to the practice of wearing Burqa or Niqab are put forth by our interviewees. In 
contrast to the media debate, the argument of gender equality was relatively downgraded. Rather, the 
interviewees focused on assumed problems with identification and communication. It was said that the 
abovementioned veiling practices obstructed the possibility of identifying the students at school, and 
also rendered the communication – and hence the instructions – at school more difficult. In 
comparison with the question of Islamic denominational schools, the non-tolerant stance was more 
manifest, although few explicit calls for a prohibition were made. Moreover, a specific discursive 
framing of the veiling practices could be discerned. The wearing of Burqa or Niqab was associated 
with phenomena such as mischief and the hidden, thus casting suspicion over the practice in question.  
As an instance of the everyday life, rather than an institutional arrangement, veiling practices could 
arguably be considered to be of less concern for educational policy than the establishment and 
maintenance of Islamic denominational schools. Still, the question of prohibition has gained a lot 
media attention during the last years, and brought the regulating dimension to the fore. And though our 
material contains few explicit calls for prohibition, several interviewees claimed that a teacher must 
see the face of the student in order to instruct and educate. And although the goal of equivalence was 
less relevant in this matter, the practice of veiling was questioned with reference to universal human 
rights, as the rights of the child. The right of the parent to exert influence in religious matter was 
questioned, since it could be regarded as a limitation of the freedom to choose direction to the walk of 
life. Thus, it seems like that the right to wear Burqa and Niqab in public schools are among the non-
tolerable, although few explicit calls for prohibition can be discerned. So far, the material in our 
report, consisting of relatively limited set of qualitative data resonates with the broader tendency 
discerned by Orlando Mella, Irving Palm and Kristin Bromark (2011): the resistance in Sweden 
against the Burqa and the Niqab is compact; almost nine Swedes out of ten find it (totally or partly) 
unacceptable to wear Burqa and Niqab, respectively, at school or at work (Mella et al 2011:30), 
whereas seven out of ten find it (totally or partly) unacceptable to wear Burqa and Niqab at other 
public places. 
As noted above, the stress on equivalence consists of two distinct although related arguments. On the 
one hand, there is a demand for abidance by the law (here: steering documents such as national 
curriculum and syllabi), which among other things are paid attention to because Islamic schools are 
suspected not to follow these steering documents accordingly. This interpretation of “equivalence” is 
related to an understanding of the term which has become more and more frequent since the 
introduction of freedom of choice and independent schools in Swedish educational policy, and the 
decentralized system of governance of education in Sweden (Lindensjö & Lundgren 2002). In this 
context, where regulation is obtained through management by objective and evaluation, and 
responsibilities are spread between numerous responsible organizations, the goal of equivalence is 
equivalent (!) to abiding by the law.  
  
On the other hand, there is wish to maintain socially integrated educational environments, in which 
students from different ethnicities, classes and gender meets and interacts. Thus, it seems like the 
equalizing and integrative objectives which were central to the compulsory school project 
implemented during the heyday of the Scandinavian welfare regime (Esping-Andersen 1990) seem to 
be “alive and kicking”. But the quest for recognition of minority beliefs systems, central to the policy 
of multiculturalism, is circumscribed. In so far, the arguments employed here gives priority to the 
reproduction of “demos” over the reproduction of “ethnos”. It must also be noted that the freedom of 
choice, an important feature in the neoliberal turn of educational policy, does not seems to be so 
important for the interviewees in this particular matter.  
If we focus on the most elaborated objections in the report, we find arguments which 1) was presented 
as a response to the presumably universalist claims of freedom of religion, thus setting the professional 
considerations which are presented above in a more general, ethical context, and 2) focused on an 
ethical value of overriding importance, viz. the rights of the child. Emphasis is laid on the right of the 
child to “choose his own path”, a wording which is used by several interviewees, which most of all 
seems to refer to the first paragraph in article 14 in the United Nations convention on the Rights of the 
Child, which aims at protecting “the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion”. 
In the arguments of the teachers, the headmasters and the union representatives, this ethical principle 
makes it to possible to assert that children possess the freedom from the religion (as well as from other 
loyalties, or sets of ideas and beliefs) of their parents. Although not explicitly questioning the parents 
rights’ to raise and guide their own children, they distinctly emphasize the autonomy of the child, and 
it’s potential to choose something else than that which is given within the family.  
The emphasis on the rights of the child is regularly explicated in a specific discursive context. The 
right to “choose one’s own path” is contrasted to the restrictions inherent in the religiosity of the 
parents. Religion is regularly depicted as the repressive force, and the secular mind-set as the entity in 
need of protection. The possibility of secular parents putting down religious inclinations among their 
children is never represented. Evidently, a discursive coupling of religion with repression and 
secularism with liberation may be discerned in the claims for freedom from religion. It may also be 
noted, that the impact from parental (Islamic) faith is the only aspect of upbringing which is 
questioned in this context. The arguments against tolerance or recognition of Islamic belief practices 
in this report are not primarily based on islamophobic or orientalistic discourses, but with reference to 
notions of equality. The interviewees stress the professional aspect of their opposition against veiling 
practices. They dissociate themselves from standpoints put forth in media, above all those who solely 
focus on the gender aspect of complete veiling practices. Instead, their emphasis on the professional 
educator dimension entails a focus on communication and identification. These acts of discursive 
positioning might be seen as an effort to “maximize the intertextual gap” between their own argument 
and the discourse in media, which to a fair-sized extent was articulated by radical right-wing populists. 
This dilemma is solved by the rhetoric of equivalence, which offers a way to reject claims of 
recognition in tandem with the defence of values as diverse and important as social justice, the rule of 
law and the freedom of the individual (child). Thus, the non-tolerance of religiously motivated veiling 
practices could be motivated with values which is central to diverse but culturally dominant 
ideological universes, such as socialism and (neo-)liberalism. 
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(1) Introduction 
The general aim of this report is to describe and analyze the embodiment of acceptance and 
recognition in discourses and practices which address cultural diversity in the Swedish educational 
system. In order to fulfil this general aim, we study how different categories of practitioners in the 
Swedish school system, such as teachers, headmasters and union representatives, and other 
stakeholders, such as civil servants, and representatives of political parties and the civil society, 
discuss and relate to the claims of recognition put forth by Muslim practitioners and/or policy 
measures designed to reach the fulfilment of those claims. Two cases are studied: the establishment of 
Muslim independent schools and the claims to dress veiled in public schools, put forth by Muslim 
youth.  
The purpose of this study is threefold. First, we will describe the general attitudes among teachers, 
headmasters and other categories of professionals with an interest in educational matters towards the 
existence of Islamic denominational schools and the practice of wearing Burqa and/or Niqab in public 
schools. Second, we will describe which arguments that are employed in the opposition of those 
phenomena, and implicitly or explicitly argue for the closing-down of those schools or a prohibition of 
the abovementioned veiling practices. Third, we will analyze the ideological and policy-related 
underpinnings of those arguments. The main objectives  of this study are extracted  from a perspective 
on  acceptance, tolerance and recognition compiled and developed by Jan Dobbernack and Tariq 
Modood (2010). To put in the phrasing of Dobbernack and Modood, we examine  whether the 
practices of ethnic or religious minorities are not tolerated, tolerated or recognized, thus suggesting an 
analytical framework consisting of the categories non-tolerance, toleration and recognition, respect as 
equal and admission as normal. 
Non-toleration occurs when “individuals, groups and practices who seek for or for whom/which 
claims of toleration are being made but to whom/which toleration is not granted, and the reasons are 
given in favour of or against toleration” (Dobbernack & Modood 2011: 31-32). Toleration, on the 
other hand, occurs when the opposite is the case – the groups, individuals and practices in question are 
tolerated, and the reasons for it are given in favour of or against toleration. The third category 
describes claims for recognition, respect as equal and admission as normal, i.e. when toleration is not 
enough, and other normative concepts such as equality, respect, recognition, accommodation, which 
focus on majority-minority relations and the reform of institutions and citizenship, are more relevant. 
Thus, in this report we study whether demands from ethnic or religious minorities (such as demands 
for the acceptance of the veiling practices Burqa and/or Niqab) or institutionalized arrangements (such 
as the possibility to establish Islamic denominational schools) are met by non-toleration, toleration or 
recognition, respect as equal and admission as normal.  
It has been claimed that the category of tolerance contains an element of disapproval and objection 
(Brown 2006) that, though balanced out and overridden by reasons for forbearance and acceptance, 
may be seen to perpetuate a condescension, smear or denigration on minority groups (cf. Dobbernack 
& Modood 2011). Many contemporary media debates on the multiethnic condition, in Sweden and 
elsewhere, are centered round an implicit binary opposition between the tolerant, Western majority, 
and the potentially intolerant and probably Muslim minority. From this perspective, the rhetoric of 
tolerance “identifies tolerance and the tolerable with the West, marking nonliberal societies and 
practices as candidates for an intolerant barbarism that itself is signaled by the putative intolerance 
ruling these societies” (Brown 2006:6). In order not to reproduce this approach, some caution is 
needed, and it must be noted that this report primarily approaches the notion of tolerance in an 
empirical, sociological way: what is tolerated, what is not tolerated, and why?  
  
The educational system in Sweden 
In Sweden, attendance at school is compulsory for all children aged 7-16, but the age when children 
may start school is flexible. A child can start school as a six, seven or eight-year old. Compulsory 
school is mandatory and free of charge. The vast majority of schools in Sweden are municipally-run, 
i.e. the municipality is the owner. Usually, children attend a municipal school close to their homes. 
However, the pupils and their parents are entitled to choose another municipal school, or a school that 
is run independently. The independent schools are open to all children and must have been approved 
by Skolverket, the Swedish National Agency for Education (SNAE). Teaching in independent schools 
has more or less the same objectives as those of the municipal school, but can have an orientation that 
differs from that of the municipal schools. The definition of an independent school is that the school is 
run by a private actor such as a company or an association. If the school does not comply with current 
regulations, SNAE can withdraw its permit. In several cases, independent schools have a different 
orientation from municipal schools, including special teaching methods (Montessori or Waldorf), a 
linguistic/ethnic orientation, or a certain religious profile, even though there is a non-negligible 
number of schools whose orientation similar to the public schools (Skolverket 2011a).  
The schooling system is decentralized; a number of general goals and guidelines are formulated on the 
national, central level, and then the municipalities and the local schools are given the responsibility to 
design and work out the activity which has to arrive at the national goals; it is a goal-based system 
with a high degree of local responsibility. The guidelines and the goals are expressed in a number of 
steering documents. The national curriculum (läroplanen) describes the school's basic goals and 
guidelines, and also its fundamental values, the so called “value-base” (värdegrund). These are 
common to the compulsory comprehensive school, as well as the Sami school, the compulsory school 
for children with learning disabilities and the school for the deaf and hearing-impaired. There is also a 
national syllabus for each individual subject, and a national time schedule which states the minimum 
guaranteed time that pupils are entitled to teacher-led instruction in the various subjects. At the 
municipal level, there is a municipal school plan that shows how the municipality's schools are to be 
organised and developed, and at the local level, we find a work plan for each school, which is an 
adaptation of the contents of the national curriculum, the syllabi and the school plan to the 
organization, work methods and local circumstances of that school (Skolverket 2011b). 
All young people in Sweden who have finished compulsory school are entitled to three years of 
schooling at upper secondary. Upper secondary education provides a platform of knowledge for 
further studies and for a future career. Upper secondary education comprises the regular upper 
secondary school and the upper secondary for young people with learning disabilities. It offers various 
types of programs: first, 17 national programs, which last for three years. These are divided into 
mandatory courses, optional courses, individual choices core subjects and project work; then, 
individual programs for pupils with particular educational needs (which for example include pupils 
who want to do an apprenticeship), and last specially designed local programs, which combine 
subjects from the various national programs. Secondary education is not mandatory in a formal sense, 
but it is more or less regarded as mandatory, since the labour market for young persons without 
secondary education is virtually non-existent.  
From equality to equivalence and freedom of choice 
The Swedish educational system went through substantial changes during the 20th century, from the 
so-called “parallel school system”, consisting of separate schools for the elite and the working class, to 
a formally integrated - still internally deeply divided - comprehensive school system (Bunar 2008). 
During this process, which in main was carried out by social democratic governments, education was 
particularly seen as one of the main instruments for achieving more social equality in a developing 
welfare society and in ensuring social citizenship, especially during the years of social politics 
expansion in the 1950’s and 60’s (Lindensjö & Lundgren 2002, Richardson 2010). Through numerous 
  
reforms, social democratic governments intervened on the field of education, by changing the 
organizational structure of the schools. In tandem with this process, new positions and new status 
differences appeared within the formally integrated schools. There were no special educational 
institutions catering solely to the elite, but a deep gap opened between different public schools, 
depending on which social group - working class, immigrants, middle-class Swedes etc. - dominated 
the particular neighborhood and thereby the particular school (Bunar 2008).  
Moreover, it can also be said that the educational system gradually was incorporated into a new 
ideological order; virtually every aspect of education that allegedly contributed to the reproduction of 
social differences and in sustaining the old social order was changed. The education reforms during 
the post-war period had a strong focus on equality, thus promoting equality of opportunity and 
outcome through a system which deliver education of the same quality to everyone. During the 1970’s 
and 80’s, however, the goal of equality, which was central for the above mentioned reform program, 
was redefined and re-articulated in terms of the goal of equivalence, which stipulates that the 
education delivered at school should be of equal value to everyone. According to the researchers Bo 
Lindensjö and Ulf P Lundgren (2002: 86-91), there are at least two distinct causes behind this change. 
First, it was an attempt to avoid the radical political connotations of the term “equality”. Second, it 
was a pragmatic adjustment to the difficulties involved in implementing equality in education; since 
the capacity and hence the needs of the pupils varied, the focus should be on supplying education that 
was of value for everyone, rather than a uniform format. Thus, it was implied that different needs has 
to be recognized, and that an overall homogeneity was not desirable, not even for the equality 
objective. Lindensjö and Lundgren (2002) also note that the goal of “equivalence” often tends to be 
interpreted as “to offer education in accordance with the national curricula” or “to offer instructions by 
qualified teachers”.  
Not only was diversity in needs acknowledged. Gradually, the question of parental influence over 
education became more important. This question rose during the 1970’s, to a large extent as a reaction 
to the strong centralist tendencies in-built in the integrated comprehensive school project. This anti-
centralist tendency grew stronger during the 1980’s, when the ideological tenets of neoliberalism and 
the ideals set out in the new public management agenda gained ground – in education as well as other 
sectors of public administration and production of welfare goods (Green Pedersen 2002). Between 
1992 and 1994, a number of educational reforms were carried through in Sweden, which changed the 
organization and production of primary (and secondary) education in a fundamental way. The 
municipalities gained much more influence over primary and secondary education; parents were given 
the right to decide which school their children should attend, and a voucher system was introduced, 
giving parents the right to chose between public and private (so-called independent) schools (Green 
Pedersen 2002, Bunar 2008).  
According to educational scientist Tomas Englund (1993), a shift of perspective in educational policy 
took place during the 1980’s and early 1990’s; education became a private good, and an instrument for 
individual capital acquisition, rather than a public good. “Freedom of choice” became the overriding 
principle in many official discourses on education, and the ethos of equality lost its appeal. The social 
ambitions of the educational system become more diffuse during the 1990’s (Blomquist & Rothstein 
2000). Still, the goal of equivalence maintained its strong position (Lindensjö & Lundgren 2002), as it 
was compatible with the promotion of a new system of accountability and its emphasis on the 
evaluation of student achievements (cf. Englund 2003). In this new discursive context, the goal of 
“equivalence” also became a keyword in the endeavors to control the outcomes/products from public 
as well as private suppliers of education, assuring that the same standard of education is provided 
throughout the country.  
The advent of the independent schools in 1992 has posed a serious challenge to the basic ideological 
foundations of the Swedish educational system (Bunar 2008). With the principle of non-separation, 
which aimed at counteracting differentiation of children into schools based on class, gender or 
  
ethnicity, education was earlier “regarded as an instrument for equalizing class differences, providing 
a meeting place for children with different social and cultural backgrounds and an education free of 
religious or commercial involvement (Bunar 2008:424). With the establishment of independent 
schools - adding up to 714 schools on primary level and 414 on secondary level in 2011, providing 
education for roughly every tenth student on primary level and every fifth student on secondary level 
(Friskolornas Riksförbund 2011, Skolverket 2011c) - the development is going in the opposite 
direction. High achievers and students of middle class background are concentrated to a limited 
number of schools (Bunar 2008). Moreover, about ten percent of the children in independent schools 
attend to a confessional independent school, i.e. 8 000 pupils at primary level and xxx on secondary.  
A number of studies in different academic disciplines suggest (e.g. Arnman et al 2004, Daun 2003, cf. 
Bunar 2010:9), among them a number of studies from SNAE (e.g. Skolverket 1996, 2003), has pointed 
that the selected use of school choice has augmented not only social segregation in Sweden, but also 
the ethnic, particularly in relation to schools in relatively deprived areas in the suburbs of Stockholm, 
Gothenburg and Malmö. Still, a good-sized number of students have during the last decade left low-
achieving and stigmatized suburban schools in the above mentioned cities, opting for high-status 
middle-class schools in areas predominantly populated by non-migrant Swedes. But recent studies also 
indicate that they haven’t reached any relevant “measures of integration”, such as raising their average 
grades or making friends with children living in the school’s attendance zone (Bunar & Kallstenius 
2007, Bunar 2010). Thus, a fair number of students have used the possibilities put at disposal by the 
independent school reform, but it has not enhanced their social capital and thus not yet changed their 
social position.  
Those developments suggest that the goals of equality and freedom of choice are not wholly 
compatible. Though, it must be noted, that after 20 years of developments in educational policy under 
the aegis of “freedom of choice”, even the advocates of such a policy have raised doubts over its 
adequacy and efficacy. In recognition of  the limitations of a decentralized school system, , the 
promotion of  equivalence has been strengthened in the new national curricula, which was 
implemented during 2011 by the right-wing liberal government. . For example, the objectives in the 
national curricula are made more explicit, and the content of each subject is specified.  
Tolerance, recognition and education policy  
In Sweden, policies towards different immigrant and minority groups during the first two decades of 
the post-war migration were in general assimilatory, and the tolerance for or recognition of various 
cultural identities and customs was by and large absent from the official political agenda and the 
public discussion. In addition, there was no systematic reception policy. The period of assimilationist 
policy was not put to an end until 1975, when multiculturalism became an important element in the 
Swedish model of welfare-state politics (cf. Roth & Hertzberg 2010). In Swedish multiculturalism, 
welfare ideology objectives focused on “equality” occupy a central position; the other main objectives 
were “freedom of choice” and “partnership”; thus paraphrasing the slogans of the French revolution: 
liberte, egalite, et fraternite:  
The goal of equality implies the continued efforts to give immigrants the same living standard as 
the rest of the population. The goal of freedom of choice implies that public initiatives are to be 
taken to assure members of ethnic and linguistic minorities domiciled in Sweden a genuine choice 
between retaining and developing their cultural identity and assuming a Swedish cultural identity. 
The goal of partnership implies that the different immigrant and minority groups on the one hand 
and the native population on the other both benefit from working together (Hammar 1985: 33) 
Notwithstanding the relatively far-reaching promises for the recognition of perceived alterity, and the 
cultural expressions of non-dominant ethnic groups, the issue of cultural diversity was not even 
mentioned in the  new national curricula, which was introduced in 1980 (Runfors 2003). Some issues 
  
relating to migration had been debated already in the 1960’s, for example the question of home 
language (Borevi 2002, Hällgren et al 2006), and by the end of the decade, instructions in home 
language and “home culture” (Hällgren et al 2006:315) was offered to some minority students, as an 
addition to the compulsory instructions. In 1976, a large-scale reform was fully implemented, 
recognizing the right to instructions in non-Swedish home languages. Still, certain attention was given 
to the specific demands of migrant children in educational policy during the early1970’s, mainly 
focusing on their possible shortcomings and learning problems, especially their shortcomings in 
learning Swedish (Borevi & Strömblad 2004) . As a number of authors has noted (Gruber 2001, 
Mulinari 2007, cf. Runfors 2003), the category of migrant children became singled out as problematic 
category, in need of special measures.  
In line with this “problem-focused” agenda, the full implementation of the home language reform of 
1976 was by and large predicated on the belief that instructions in home language were beneficial for 
the overall school achievement of migrant students. Learning a home language facilitated learning in 
Swedish as well as other school subjects, it was said. Thus, the reform was not primarily motivated 
with reference to multiculturalist objectives such as recognition or freedom of choice, but with 
reference to its general utility (Borevi 2002). Accordingly, political scientist Karin Borevi (2002, ch. 
5) points out that the attempts to adapt the Swedish educational system to the new multi-cultural or 
multi-ethnic conditions during the late 1960’s, 70’s and early 80’s, and the discussions that followed 
during the production of public educational policy, highlights some of the ideological tensions in the 
Swedish model of welfare policy.  
On the one hand, Borevi argues, it was considered desirable to accept and recognize the fact Swedish 
citizens now enjoyed membership in different ethnic communities, or ethnos. On the other hand, one 
wanted to promote integration within one single community of citizens, or demos; the equalizing and 
integrative objectives of the compulsory school project were explicit in that case. Still, Borevi 
concludes that “even though the tensions were clearly present in the discourse […], they were not 
explicitly noticed or dealt with by the agents” (Borevi 2002:327). Although the goal of recognition – 
strongly heralded by the multiculturalist policy introduced in 1975 - was paid attention to, it could in 
practice be subordinated to the goal of social cohesion. If any possible special needs of migrant pupils 
were considered, it was primarily in order promote their integration into the mainstream society, and 
hence to promote the overall social cohesion, not to recognize their belonging to an ethnos external to 
the imagined community of the majority.  
During the 1980’s, however, the idea of recognition got more influential. Instructions for a general 
“inter-cultural” pedagogy were introduced in official educational policy in 1983 (Hällgren et al 2006), 
thus “promoting an enhanced understanding of and respect for differences in cultural expressions” 
(Rubinstein Reich & Tallberg Broman 2000:11). The general social value of diversity in educational 
setting was also gradually acknowledged. It was for example acknowledged that the ethnic diversity of 
the classroom ought to be mirrored in the instructions, in subjects such as history or religion; whether 
or not the idea got carried into action or not is of course hard to tell. Following the neoliberal turn in 
Swedish educational policy during the late 1980’s (above), in which its equalizing objectives were 
subordinated to the promotion of freedom of choice, and education became a private rather than a 
public good, the diversity in demands on education was more and more paid attention to. It is thus 
signifying that the national curricula from 1994 (Lpo 94) were the first steering document in which it 
is clearly stated that Sweden is a multi-ethnic and multicultural society (Hällgren et al 2006).Still, as 
Sabine Gruber (2001) notes, the category of “migrant pupils” (sv. invandrarelever) continued to be 
depicted in policy texts as a problematic category whose problems, cultures and traditions contrasted 
to the modernity and rationality of Swedish pupils.  
Although the multicultural condition was acknowledged in the 1994 curricula, it could arguably be 
said that the objective of recognizing cultural diversity was not central to it. The focus was set on 
equal rights and responsibilities, rather than the recognition of particularistic demands (cf. Roth & 
  
Hertzberg 2011). On the one hand, the need for anti-discriminatory measures was emphasized in the 
new policy (Hällgren et al 2006), but on other the policy also contained numerous explicit calls for 
adherence to common and allegedly Swedish fundamental values (värdegrund) in education. Thus, 
tolerance, openness, gender equality and a democratic disposition was designed as desirable qualities 
and constituents of a set of Swedish fundamental values in this new national curriculum, which should 
constitute a foundation for the Swedish educational system. It was explicitly also noted in the new 
educational policy that members of other ethnic groups should adhere to those Swedish values. 
Paradoxically, values such as tolerance, openness and diversity was at one and the same time both 
acclaimed and employed as device for accentuating the distance to and inferiority of the migrant other 
(Dahlstedt & Hertzberg 2010). Thus, in this educational policy, Swedish multiculturalism was firmly 
set as a national project.  
The efforts to combat racism and ethnic discrimination in everyday school life were predicated on the 
conviction that those phenomena represented a threat and an insult to pupils of non-dominant 
ethnicities, and an infringement of their civic rights. As such, it could arguably be acknowledged as a 
manifestation of recognition. In 2002, a number of groups – Finns, Jews, Meänkieli (or 
Tornedalsfinnish), Roma and Sámi - achieved the status of “national minorities”. The municipalities 
got responsible for ensuring that all pupils completing primary school has some basic knowledge of 
the national minorities’ culture, language, religion and history; moreover, they were obliged to provide 
instructions in mother tongue in schools for the national minorities, in accordance with the general 
provisions. Thus, it can be claimed that the demands of national or migrant minorities to a substantial 
degree are recognized, thus following the guidelines provided by multiculturalist political philosophy 
(although the right to instructions in home language was slightly restricted during the 1980’s, and the 
status of the subject changed, from compulsory subject to optional; Borevi & Strömblad 2003). 
Still, this is hardly the full picture. As a general observation, it must be noted that a significant gulf 
between theory and practice could be discerned in the implementation of multiculturalism and anti-
racism in the public sector (Hertzberg 2006). Despite the promises of recognition and the 
dissemination of the diversity oratory, the practitioners of the welfare state repeatedly express – in 
discourse as well as in practice – a plea for conformity to perceived Swedish norms and standards. 
Hence, there is an attitude of non-tolerance vis-à-vis the norms and customs of minority groups that 
are perceived to be not in tune with the basic norms of the majority culture. A number of studies 
suggest that this also holds true for the school system. Occurrences of discrimination and/or racism in 
the school system are not only a matter of bullying and slurs from other pupils, but also prejudiced and 
stigmatizing treatment from the school staff (e.g. Parszyk 1999, Sawyer 2006, Mulinari 2007, 
Lundqvist 2007); the tendency of teachers to – consciously or unconsciously - reward pupils acting in 
accordance with their own set of values, norms and habits, accurately described by educational 
sociologists such as Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu & Passeron 1990) has probably been in function here.  
Moreover, critics of the Swedish school system (Tesfahuney 1997, Gruber 2001, Francia 2007) has 
pointed to the existence of homogenizing forces in educational policy as well as practice, in which 
perspectives on upbringing, education and traditions of the migrant other has been depreciated, 
neglected and considered to be deviant. Rather than being multicultural, those critics claim that the 
Swedish educational system suffers under a strong monocultural tendency. This argument unfolds in 
two directions. Guadalupe Francia (2007) claims that the strong calls for social equality expressed in 
Swedish educational policy during the decades following World War II also established a strong belief 
in and affirmation of the educative capacities of the school. A strong norm for fostering children, 
informed by cutting-edge psychological and pedagogical scientific findings, was disseminated at 
schools and indirectly passed on to the parents. Perspectives on upbringing and learning expressed by 
minority groups were, according to Francia (2007:42) condemned and marginalized. Francia’s 
argument echoes the critique put forth by among other British sociologist Keith Pringle, who claims 
that Swedish welfare institutions are characterized by a “mono-cultural rigidity” (2003), which, 
  
informed by functionalism and scientism, is keen to categorize the irregular as “deviant” (cf. 
Hertzberg 2008).  
Mekonnen Tesfahuney (1997), on the other hand, connects the monoculturalist stance found in the 
Swedish educational system to the continued existence of a colonial and racializing frames of 
reference and value hierarchies. Tesfahuney claims that the Swedish school system, as being a part of 
the “Western educational system” (Tesfahuney 1997:66), is central to the reproduction of racist, 
nationalist and sexist discourses and practices, as well as global hierarchies and injustice. In official 
education, a Western, male and white norm is (re)created, and Non-western, female and non-white 
identities are perceived and constructed as deviant. Phenomena such as enlightment, progress, 
civilization and liberalism are depicted as a part of a singular and exclusively Western tradition, to 
which education is instrumental and fundamental. Moreover, the industrialized and liberal West is 
constituted as the legitimate center of the world. Evidently, rather than focusing on the specifics of 
Swedish educational policy, and following writers such as Franz Fanon (1967) and Edward Said 
(1978), Tesfahuney points out the significance of patterns of thought and representation which are 
persistent across several European and North American countries.  
The symbolic order or mode of discourse depicted by Francia (2007) and Tesfahuney (1997) respecti-
vely might, in line with the theory of structuration put forth by Anthony Giddens (1984:31), be descri-
bed as a “structure of signification”. This structure makes certain social actions possible and other hard 
to perform. Acting out in line with the norms and standards set out by minority cultures is probably 
quite often to be found in the latter case, as being depreciated and devalued by formal and informal 
majority institutions. Whether the discourses described by Francia and Tesfahuney are employed 
consciously or not, they will very likely obstruct the implementation of the multiculturalist goals 
expressed in notions such as “tolerance” or “recognition”.  
Islamic independent schools and the issue of complete veiling in school 
The paragraphs above claims to represent the development in Swedish educational policy during the 
last decades, in general as well as with special regard to questions of recognition; still, it is a mere 
outline of a discourses and processes much more complex than indicated above. Nevertheless, our 
purpose is to highlight some of the contradictions and conceptual tensions which surface, when multi-
ethnic conditions and imperatives  of tolerance and recognition has to be considered in educational 
policy. In the following study, we will examine how those imperatives are dealt with in two particular 
cases, and how they are related to the tricky educational policy questions encapsulated in the 
conceptual oppositions of “equivalence” and “freedom of choice”, “demos” and “ethnos”, and also 
“monoculturalism” and “multiculturalism”, respectively. 
To put it more exact: we will study how different categories of practitioners in the Swedish school 
system, such as teachers, headmasters and union representatives, and other stakeholders, such as civil 
servants, and representatives of political parties and the civil society, discuss and relate to the claims 
of recognition put forth by Muslim practitioners and/or policy measures designed to reach the 
fulfilment of those claims. Two cases are studied: the establishment of Muslim independent schools 
and the claims to dress veiled in public schools, put forth by Muslim youth.  
The cases are selected with consideration to a number of circumstances. First, the faith and belief 
practices of Muslim migrants have been debated on a large scale in Swedish media during the last 
decade, as in many other West European and North American countries. It is quite common that these 
practices has been put under scrutiny, and subjected to extensive critique (Malm 2009, ch. 2, Gardell 
2010). In populist or radical right-wing quarters, it is said that the enactment of Muslim belief 
practices is a part of a slow but threatening “islamization” of Sweden (Malm 2009). Given the fact that 
Sweden traditionally has been characterized by a majority religion (i.e. Lutheran Christianity which 
also formed the base for a state church until the year of 2000), the space for religious diversity and 
tolerance has been rather limited in Sweden (see below and Roth & Hertzberg 2010). 
  
The attention paid to Muslim belief practices and institutions has also involved Muslim 
denominational schools and the practice of wearing Burqa and Niqab, and, more generally, other 
forms of veiling. The establishment of denominational schools during the last two decades, whether 
Islamic or not, has also received a lot of attention, in mainstream media as well as in debates on 
education policy. For instance, a number of political parties – and not only radical right-wing parties - 
have voiced demands to keep down the number of Islamic denominational schools. The practice of 
more or less “complete” veiling, as described with the notions of “Burqa” or “Niqab” has also reached 
a lot of attention in public debate, not least since a young women dressed in Burqa filed a complaint to 
the national ombudsman against discrimination (Diskrimineringsombudsmannen, DO) in 2009, in 
which she claimed that she was subjected to discrimination on religious grounds at her school, when 
she dressed in a Burqa. Again, several political parties – once again, not only radical right-wing parties 
- put the questioning at the centre of the political debate, when they recommended a ban on complete 
veiling at public schools.  
Second, Muslim migrants has, according to a number of studies, been subjected to direct and indirect 
discrimination. Whether this discrimination primarily is religious to its nature, or ethnic, and hence 
targeting their ethnic identity, is not always concluded, but the extensive negative attention mentioned 
above suggests that the scope of religiously motivated discrimination is either predominant or on the 
rise (Sander 2004, Gardell 2010). The enactment of Muslim belief practices is not infrequently 
obstructed. For example, the construction of Mosques does seldom take place in silence; frequent and 
high-pitched voices of rejection and disapproval are common, and when the buildings once are 
completed, the congregations receive numerous threats and insults (Gardell 2010). The opposition is 
evident (Integrationsverket 2005, 2006), and two mosques has been burned down. Moreover, women 
wearing burqa or niqab report being harassed in public (Berge & Manga 2006, Gardell 2010; 
moreover, some studies also report harassment of women in hijab veiling, which only covers hair and 
shoulders; Englund 2006, Listerborn 2011 ). Apart from the lack of recognition and acceptance in 
religious matters, the prevalence of discriminatory mechanisms might also obstruct the access to 
welfare services and the entry to the labour market. Third, the general policy discussions that has 
emerged in relation to those phenomena are obviously also connected to the policy questions outlined 
above; those connections will be elucidated in the introduction to each case, in the following sections.  
Apart from that, some general observations on the nature of the selected cases might be explicated. 
The gradual establishment of Islamic denominational schools obviously concerns the structure of the 
education system; by and large, it became possible through the introduction of a voucher system and 
the so-called independent schools in 1992. This reform constitutes a sharp break with the earlier 
educational policy regime in Sweden. Thus, the reform was not primarily a measure promoting the 
recognition of religious minorities, but rather a change of government in education, in line with the 
neo-liberal agenda of “New public management”. Being so, it is not infrequent that the establishments 
at stake are regarded as an “unforeseen consequence” of this neo-liberal turn in educational policy (cf. 
Roth 1999, Bunar 2008). Islamic organizations were not a leading actor in this policy change; rather, 
they made use of a new opportunity structure which emerged through the implementation of a new 
education regime. In general, it might nevertheless be said that the possibility for a religious minority 
to arrange and offer primary and secondary education in denominational schools might be considered 
as a fulfilment of the objective of recognition, which is a constituent of multiculturalist policy.  
In the second case, concerning the practice of wearing Burqa or Niqab in public schools, the initiative 
is coming from young practicing Muslims. It is a rather spontaneous phenomenon, not directly 
supported by any of the larger Muslim organizations in Sweden. As such, it is a matter of how young 
female Muslims wishes to present themselves in the social context at school. In terms of morals, it 
could be said that the claim to wear a headscarf in public school is a claim for toleration; the agents do 
not necessarily seek approval of or support for their dress-code; rather, they just want to dress in line 
with their conviction and/or faith (cf. Dobbernack & Moodod 2011).  
  
Methodological considerations 
This report consists of two cases studies, which relies solely on qualitative data. The main part of the 
empirical material consists of interviews with 22 persons – nine teacher students, three teachers, three 
headmasters, two union representatives, two civil servants, one jurist, one imam and one 
representative of a political party. The interviews are used as a source for both cases. As additions to 
interviews, we have collected newspaper articles, memos from public authorities, bills introduced to 
the parliament, debates on commentary fields in web-edition of newspapers, et cetera.  Being a small  
study, it is necessary to make some reservations concerning the reliability of our material. Thus, it is 
difficult to determine whether or not it is possible to make generalizations from our material, thus 
asserting that the viewpoints found in our material are overlapping with or similar to the attitudes of 
other teachers, headmasters et cetera. Still, as it is a qualitative study, it does not aim for 
representativeness and reliability, but at describing an instance of the meaning production on Islam, 
religion and the politics of recognition at Swedish schools. 
 Let us briefly introduce our interviewees. Peter is his early fifties and a teacher in Swedish and 
English at a upper secondary school in northern Stockholm, in a school were the percentage of 
students of migrant background are close to the national average. Martin is a teacher in history and 
geography at another upper secondary school, also located in the northern Stockholm area. He is in the 
early thirties and works at schools were the percentage of migrant students is close to hundred percent. 
The third teacher is named Ann; she is in her late forties and works in a primary school in area 
neighboring Martins, and her subjects are maths and natural science. John is in his late forties and a 
headmaster at a primary school in southern Stockholm, in a school with an “average” level of pupils 
with foreign back ground, although he until recently worked as a headmaster in the same area as 
Martin for twenty years. Lena’s personal and professional overlap with Johns; her school is located 
close to his, and she used to work in the same area as him (and Martin), although her experience as a 
headmaster are slightly shorter. Alice, Amy, Elias, Gertrud, Katarina, Linn, Lizette, Noomi and Marit 
are students at the teacher education at Stockholm University. Alice and Katarina are in their late 
thirties; Amy, Gertrud and Noomi are in their early twenties, and Elias, Linn, Lizette and Marit are in 
their late twenties. Linn is of Finnish decent.  
David is a higher representative at the National Unions of Teachers (Lärarnas Riksförbund). He is in 
his early fifties, and also a teacher on leave. Sarah is in her early sixties and an employed senior 
official at the Swedish Teachers Union (Lärarförbundet). Mehdi is a headmaster at an Islamic 
denominational school located close to the area where Ann’s school is located. He is in his late fifties; 
of Tunisian decent but has been working as an executive in the Swedish trade and industry for over 
twenty years. Mahmud is one of the Imams at the main mosque in Stockholm, and a representative of 
one of central Swedish Muslim organizations. He is also of Tunisian decent, but has been working in 
Sweden for thirty years. Sylvia is a senior civil servant at the municipal district committee in northern 
Stockholm. She is in her fifties and among other things responsible for the reception of refugees. 
Ibrahim works at the same district committee as Sylvia, he is of Turkish decent, in his early sixties, 
and in charge of the municipal social care. Irene is a jurist at one of the trade unions (and of Chilean 
decent), but  she has been  appointed as an expert at the Ombudsman on discrimination, DO. The last 
interviewee, Lars, is in his early thirties and a political advisor at the Swedish Liberal party, 
Folkpartiet.  
(2) Case Study 1: Islamic independent deniminational schools  
The establishment of Islamic denominational schools 
As described in the introductory part of this report, the independent school system was introduced 
1992, paving the way for a considerable increase of private schools in Sweden. The independent 
  
schools made it a lot easier than before to establish schools with a different orientation from the 
municipal schools, such as special teaching methods (Montessori or Waldorf), a linguistic/ethnic 
orientation, or a certain religious profile. In 1993, Sweden’s first Muslim school opened in the 
southern city of Malmö. In 2009, the number of Islamic denominational school was nine – all of them 
compulsory schools. Six of the Islamic denominational schools are organized in the organization 
Swedish Islamic Schools (SIS, Sveriges muslimska skolor), a part of to the Swedish Islamic 
Federation (SIF, Islamiska förbundet i Sverige), one of the three major national Islamic organizations 
in Sweden. Through its connection to SIF, SIS is also connected to Swedish Muslim Council, which is 
an “umbrella organization” for Islamic organizations in Sweden.  
A short description about the religious content in the instructions  
The 1992 amendment in the Education Act, which made it less difficult to found independent schools, 
could arguably be regarded as one of the major reasons that Muslims schools began to establish in the 
Nineties (Berglund 2009). On the other hand, there are also some “push-factors” involved. A study 
conducted by SNAE in 1997 derived the following reasons that certain Muslim parents send their 
children to Muslim schools: negatively biased and inaccurate views of Islam in municipal schools (cf. 
Härenstam 1993, Otterbeck 2005), disregard for common Islamic rules respecting chastity, diet, 
fasting, dress, prayer, and so forth, poor religious education by the standards of Islam, insufficient 
discipline, fear of exposure to narcotics and alcohol, and too great a diversity of immigrant groups in 
the neighbouring municipal schools (Skolverket 1997, cf. Berglund 2009).  
The SNEA study also draw attention to the fact that a number of Muslim parents has reported 
difficulties in their interactions with municipal school officials and staffs – interactions which had left 
them feeling humiliated, alienated and shamed (Skolverket 1997). As Jenny Berglund (2007:25) notes, 
this expression of feelings may not be so surprising, considering the results from a study conducted by 
Anders Lange (2008:91), in which found that no less than 11,9 per cent of teachers are in basic 
agreement with the statement “Muslim immigrant parents in Sweden do not see their children’s best”, 
and that no less than 81 percent of the teachers state strong or moderate dislike of Muslim 
denominational schools (Lange 2008:53). Hence, the SNEA study suggests that Muslim parents 
choose to send their children to Muslim schools for purposes of security and wellbeing, not only for 
the purpose of religion. Studies conducted by Nihad Bunar and Jenny Kallstenius (2006, 2007) and 
also Jenny Berglund (2008) points in a similar direction: their choices might as well be seen as a way 
of avoiding (the risk of) discrimination and obtaining acceptance of difference.  
It could arguably be said that the amendment in the Education Act of 1992 made it possible for 
religious education to find its way back to the Swedish school system. In 1969, the subject of 
“Christianity” was changed to “religion”. The change of name signalled a change of perspective. Until 
1962, the purpose was to foster the pupils in the Christian faith; that year a school reform required the 
subject of Christianity to maintain a neutral profile with respect to questions of faith. From 1969, the 
purpose was to teach on religions and religiosity, as social and existential phenomena, in a more 
distanced, comparative and critical way. The change signalled the end of preaching Christianity in the 
Swedish school system, which from now on was held to be non-confessional. A very limited number 
of denominational private schools existed outside the public school system, as for example the Jewish 
Hillel school in Stockholm, founded in 1954 (Peste 2007), and the century-old catholic schools S:t 
Erik in Stockholm and Queen Astrid in Gothenburg; still, the latter did not receive any state funding. 
During the 1970’s and 80’s, a few evangelistic and partly state-funded denominational schools were 
allowed to start.  
The fact that religion and denominational educations was discarded in 1969 could be seen as the end 
result of a long and efficacious process of secularization. During the first decades of public education 
in Sweden, the Swedish protestant national church held a strong influence over all teaching activities 
  
in the country, a position once installed through the parish catechetical meeting system which was 
institutionalised during the 17th century, when the ability to read and the basic knowledge on Christian 
theology in the population was examined by local clergymen. Nevertheless, secularization of the 
schools occurred slowly and peacefully during the 20th century. Debates over education policy were 
less concerned with who should oversee and control the education system, than with whether to 
construct a fully democratic education system that would not separate children into different schools 
according to social class (Morgan 2002). Gradually, the ethos of Christianity and religiosity was 
replaced by the secular ethos of equality which was central to the integrated comprehensive school 
system (Rothstein 1986).  
With the implementation of the national curricula of 1969, it was decided that the Swedish school 
system should be non-confessional or non-denominational. As noted above, the instructions of the 
educational system should observe neutrality in relation to different religions. But in the national 
curricula of 1994, it was stated that this rule does not apply for the religious independent schools. In 
order with Sweden’s Education Act, however, some general goals has to be achieved whether the 
schools are independent or public (Berglund 2009), such “imparting, installing and forming in pupils 
those fundamental values on which our society is based”, which “[i]n accordance with the ethics borne 
by Christian tradition and Western humanism by fostering the individual a sense of justice, generosity 
of spirit, tolerance and responsibility”. As Jenny Berglund notes, in the pursuit of the common aims, 
most denominational schools arrange only a small number of hours per week for the introduction of 
certain subjects, and in the case of Muslim schools, “this number amounts to one to three hours per 
week of Islamic religious education” (Berglund 2009:23). However, the local syllabi written for such 
subjects must still adhere to the above described “fundamental values” (Berglund 2009, cf. above). 
Arguably, the scope for a distinctly Islamic or Muslim curriculum is quite limited (cf. Gardell 2010).  
Islamic schools in doubt 
As noted above, the sudden increase of denominational schools has received a good deal of attention, 
in public media as well as in the debate on educational policy in Sweden, and the same goes for the 
establishment of Muslim denominational schools. For example, in 2003 Swedish television 
broadcasted documentary by the Swedish-Kurdish documentary film director and producer Evin 
Rubar, where Islamic denominational schools were represented in a negative way. In the film, 
interviews filmed with a hidden camera was shows, in which a number of headmasters at Islamic 
schools states that the do not want to cooperate with the social services in the municipality, use threats 
to force young women on the run to return to their families, and that they do not intend to follow the 
national curriculum. After the showing, an extensive media debate followed, in which Islamic schools 
frequently was depicted as a problem, and calls for ban of those schools were voiced.  
Directly prompted by the media debate, the SNAE carried out inspections in seven (out of ten then 
existing) Islamic denominational schools (Francia 2007), and two of them did not meet the standards 
required for carry on teaching, and their authorization was suspended. Two other schools got an 
injunction; within one month, they had to make  changes in their staff  in order to not to lose their 
permit. Still, the ability of Islamic denomination schools to pursue teaching was questioned in wide 
circles. It thus strengthened the doubts over whether Islamic faith schools managed to meet the 
standard of equivalence (Francia 1998, cf. Skolverket 1997). This equivalence argument is one of the 
arguments which have been given against Islamic schools in the public debate.  
Other arguments have also been raised. For instance, it has also been claimed that religious congrega-
tions – Islamic as well as Christian -by the transcendent nature of their dogmas and preachings are 
prone to give their own message – and the world-views conveyed therein - priority over other systems 
of belief, such as other religions, and over scientific knowledge, and thus inappropriate to arrange 
  
education according to the standards of objectivity (sw. “saklighet”) and comprehensibility (sw. 
“allsidighet”) given in the national curriculum and the national syllabi (Gerle 1997, cf. Roth 2007). 
Related to this argument is a third one, which claims that denominational schools violate the basic 
rights of the children such as freedom of thought, conscience and expressions, given the religious 
underpinnings of the schools (cf. Roth 2007).  
A fourth argument that has been put forth is that Islamic schools bring about values and norms alien to 
the Swedish society, for example regarding gender roles and the nature of the relations between the 
sexes (Gerle 1997). This gender equality argument has been voiced by among others present minister 
of education, liberal MP Nyamko Sabuni, who wrote an article in the Swedish daily Expressen a 
couple of months before her appointment, in which she stated that denominational schools – whether 
Muslim, catholic/ Christian or Jewish - foster women and men to traditional gender-roles (Sabuni 
2006). In the same article, Sabuni also fears that Islamic schools might develop into “a natural 
recruiting basis for future suicide bombers” (Sabuni 2006, cf. Lillman 2006). Still, this fifth argument, 
which is stressing domestic safety, is quite seldom expressed, at least outside the realms of right-wing 
populist discourse.  
A sixth argument, finally, claims that Islamic denominational schools augment the social and ethnic 
segregation of the Swedish society. Students who attend to Islamic schools do not, according to this 
argument, experience the full diversity of the Swedish multicultural and multiethnic society, and hence 
runs the risk of not fully developing the competence to understand, manage and/or esteem this 
diversity. Other proponents of the segregation argument emphasize their lack of experience from and 
knowledge on dominant Swedish norms, standards and values. Obviously, this argument touches upon 
the conflict between promoting ethnos or demos (cf. above); the proponents repeat the equalizing and 
integrative objectives of the compulsory school project, thus partly sacrificing the goal of recognition 
given in strong programmes of multiculturalism (Roth 2001).  
Thus, it is claimed that Islamic denominational schools are divisive; they provide a restricted, non-
common educational environment which separates a group of children and young people for schooling 
from the rest of the society (Halstead & McLaughlin 2005). Another variety of the argument of social 
division claims that Muslim free schools are segregating or divisive, in the sense that they separate 
recently arrived migrant Muslim children, and/or Muslim children whose parents belong to lower 
socio-economic strata, from children of more fortunate social backgrounds, thus denying them the 
possibility to enhance the value of their social capital. This argument is quite often employed in 
combination with the argument of equality, thus claiming that the allegedly poor quality of the 
education given at Islamic denominational schools increases the mixed ethnic and socio-economic 
segregation (Roth 2001).  
This outline of the arguments against Islamic denominational schools are not exhaustive in a proper 
sense, but it could reasonably be said that it covers most of the arguments that has been expressed in 
popular media, and it also gives a hint of the diversity of perspectives and/or values on which the 
arguments are premised. It must also be said, though, that the proponents of Islamic schools have put 
forth a number of counter-arguments and objections in response to these arguments. For the sake of 
completeness, it would have made sense to describe them in this context. Still, since the purpose of 
this text is to describe the context in which lack of recognition or acceptance occur, and given its 
limited scope, the above mentioned pursue for completeness is omitted.  
On the acceptance of Islamic denominational schools in Sweden  
Many of the arguments against Islamic denominational schools voiced in the public debates were also 
expressed during the interviews for this study. But the discourse that came into being during those 
  
interviews did not only oppose the existence of those schools, it also supported it. Some voices also 
expressed what can be called tolerance in a literal sense – the interviewees did not really see the point 
with the establishment of Islamic denominational schools, but they did no t oppose it or advocate a 
shutting-down of these schools. The distribution of standpoints will be described below.  
Segregation – cultural and social  
In general, one of the most common objections to the establishment of Islamic denominational schools 
was the argument that those schools have a number of negative effects on processes of social and/or 
ethnic integration. For example, Peter, one of the teachers we met during this study, claimed that those 
schools sets up a closed social setting, in which Muslim youth gets isolated from the surrounding 
society.    
Peter: Muslim independent schools tend to maintain a quite closed social environment. There are 
a number of schools in Stockholm, and […] personally, I think that it is counterproductive, from 
an educational perspective, to create an environment which shields off the mainstream Swedish 
society. Actually, the municipality of Stockholm, and its board of education gives away money, 
which … and there a number of negative consequences related to the fact that you permit religious 
believers to create a closed social context, or at least a relatively closed social context. Of course, 
I am aware of the fact that those schools do not at all resemble any straightforward Koran 
schools, I have learned that from colleagues that work in those schools and they are neither 
migrants nor Muslim believers. But the presence of those schools creates troubles, anxieties. I do 
not think that the linguistic environment is different from those in the nearby municipal school, or 
in regular independent school, […] but what really makes me react is the excluding tendency … if 
you set up a Muslim independent school, then you are quite explicit about which student you 
would like to have. The number of non-Muslims in those schools is close to zero, I suppose.  
Thus, Peter claims that the establishment of Islamic denominational schools has some negative effects 
with regards to social and ethnic segregation, is so matter that they create an closed social 
environment, in which central aspects of the mainstream society is screened off. The argument is 
obviously critical to denominational education in itself; it is premised on a negative perspective on 
religion: believers are, according to Peter, prone to establish closed social contexts. Islam, as other 
religions, is divisive in that sense. In the second part of the argument, expressed in the last three lines 
of the excerpt, Peter develops a “strong” critique of denominational schools. He claims that the 
concentration of believers to specific denominational schools is in itself is a matter of exclusion (of 
non-believers), and the fact that the interest for and admission to these schools are unevenly 
distributed is regarded as a problem. Alice, one of the students at the teacher education, developed a 
similar argument, based on the thesis of segregation: “if they have their independent schools, and 
meet, and socialize, they become … segregated. It doesn’t matter if it is a Muslim independent school 
or a music school; you create your own marked off world. And their parents socialize”.  
The anti-segregation argument was further  employed by the two civil servants, Sylvia and Ibrahim, 
which was interviewed for this study. Rather than speaking in general terms, though, they referred to 
the conditions in the area in which they worked, an area in the northern part of Stockholm, among 
other things characterized by relatively high proportions of unemployed and foreign born, but with a 
low level of average income.  
Ibrahim: The independent school reform has, among other things, got some individuals involved in 
processes which do not promote their own interest. We are talking about social networks: ”you 
are my friend, I am your friend, you are my neighbour, I am a Muslim, you are a Muslim”, and so 
forth. Do you understand? Unforeseen consequences have emerged. 
Sylvia: Exactly. There is no longer a free choice. It is not the family who choose, and not the child. 
There is someone else who says “you should go to this school”. And we have some objections to 
that, on this specific topic, we have some objections, because it is not of your their choosing. It’s 
  
like that. And maybe it is like that in other places as well, but then. Maybe, you are stronger; you 
can say … you can say “no”.  
Ibrahim: And then, earlier, it just to be very mixed and diverse out here, even though the members 
from the majority population was quite few, but now, we see a concentration of a limited number 
of groups. And the possibility for our youth, for our adults, to mix up with the mainstream society, 
it does not longer exist.  
In general, Ibrahim states that he is ambivalent in relation to Muslim independent schools. Brought up 
in Kemalist Turkey and its highly secularized education system, he developed a negative attitude 
towards denominational schools, Ibrahim explains, but quite recently, he started to develop some new 
standpoints. With the advent of Islamic denominational schools, he sees a possibility for Swedish 
Muslims; they are given a chance to “strengthen their cultural identity” and “their self-esteem”, and 
establish a positive perception of themselves. Then, they can “gain legitimacy” and “gain normality”. 
Nevertheless, his general outlook is genuinely ambivalent, considering the negative and unforeseen 
consequences outlined above. In the local context, the Islamic denominational school is a part of a 
local Muslim environment, in which the relations with members of the mainstream society are limited, 
and the knowledge on the mores of the mainstream society is false or skewed. Moreover, Sylvia also 
claims that the religious authorities in the Muslim community exert an illegitimate influence over the 
choosing of schools. An external force affects what is supposes to be a private family matter. Thus, 
Ibrahim and Sylvia raise some strong objections to the existence of Muslim independent schools, but 
also to the influence of religious authorities in general. They make some further elaborations:  
Fredrik: So, one family out of four put their children in a Muslim independent school? 
Ibrahim: Yes, that’s the way it is. […] But their picture of Stockholm, and of mainstream Swedish 
society, and of which we are, it is so limited, and it is build upon fantasies, rather than facts about 
us. Because of that, we have a responsibility to develop our citizens’ picture of the Swedish 
society.  
Sylvia: Also, that problem is made worse if you stay only in a very limited area of Stockholm, if 
you never go downtown, if you just stick around out here … and if the school is located here, and 
the mosque, then you are stuck out here. You don’t go around in the Stockholm area; you don’t 
even have a local Stockholm identity.  
Ibrahim: It is not a matter of total social isolation. They may have a job, they may be self-
supporting, but their interface with the mainstream group is very limited. And there are so many 
myths about Swedishness that predominate, myths but not reality. Some of the positive, some 
negative, but in these hard times, the negative seems to predominate, and I think that this is the 
biggest problem for democracy, when people do not have an interface of their own, own 
experiences, but have to rely on myths.  
Thus, the segregation argument is related to a representation of the “matters of fact” which strengthens 
his argument. Muslim migrant populations have a distorted picture of mainstream Swedish society, 
and the denominational schools are a constituent of the isolated social milieu which creates the 
distortion. Thus, the conditions of the Muslim population in the local community constitute, according 
to Sylvia and Ibrahim, a strong argument against the establishment of Muslim independent schools. 
Still, they do not explicitly support a closing down. Rather, their discursive strategy is to conjure up 
doubts over the suitability of these schools. To put in the phrasing of Clifford Geertz (1973): their 
representation of the world (how it is) is connected to a representation for the world (how it should 
be), but the nature of its implications is not clear-cut. They have a negative view of Islamic schools, 
but they seem to tolerate what they do not like.  
In their argument, Ibrahim and Sylvia focus mainly on the cultural aspect of the segregating quality 
ascribed to Muslim independent schools. Ibrahim actually points out that some members of the 
Muslim community in his area might be adequately integrated economically, at least when it comes to 
their position on the labor market (“They may have a job, they may be self-supporting”), but still 
segregated culturally, in so far that their knowledge of the mainstream society is defective (“have to 
  
rely on myths”). Still, other interviewees did emphasize the social aspect of this divisive quality. 
Sarah, a senior official at the Swedish Teachers Union (STU, Lärarförbundet), was explicit in this 
matter. As an answer to my question about the segregating or counter-segregating qualities of Muslim 
denominational schools, she made her standpoint clear.  
Sarah: Straight away, my opinion is that independent schools increase segregation. So it is. There 
is no other answer. The SNEA has proved that, a thousand of times. But then it is a matter of … 
who has the guts to stand up and say that the freedom of choice of schools should not exist? No 
one does that. So, you have to take the rough with the smooth, if you as a parent or a student want 
freedom of choice, that’s my opinion. And if you do not focus at the confessional/non-confessional-
dimension … the gifted students with the powerful parents with the fat wallets choose one kind of 
schools, and the losers get stuck in totally different environment. Their results get worse, and the 
equivalence disappears. So it is.  
Sarah focuses solely on the social aspect of the segregation argument. She does not consider the poten-
tially integrative qualities of the Muslim denominational schools, and she does not mention the cultu-
ral aspect of segregation put forth by for example Peter and Ibrahim. Rather, she draws attention to a 
general pattern of socio-economic segregation, not caused by Muslim independent schools per se, but 
by the introduction of the voucher system, the freedom of choice and the establishment of independent 
schools, regardless of orientation. Thus, the Muslim denominational schools get inscribed in a general 
criticism of the changes in the educational system. In order to strengthen her argument, Sarah also 
refers to reports from SNEA; thus legitimating her argument with the scientific standard of those 
reports. This argument, premised on the assumption that social and ethnic differentiation is 
undesirable, seems to have an intertextual relation to the earlier paradigm in Swedish educational 
policy, in which the principle of non-separation was heralded and differentiation was counteracted 
(Bunar 2002, Dahlstedt & Hertzberg 2010).  
In the excerpt above, we can also see that the argument of segregation is connected to the goal of 
equivalence (cf. above): since the establishment of Islamic denominational schools may increase the 
level of social and cultural segregation, the goal of equivalent education may be hard to attain. Then, 
the question of denominational schools gets framed in a new way. As noted in the first section of this 
report, the goal of “equivalence” has been central for the governance of compulsory schools in the 
Swedish educational system. Discursively, the argument of “equivalence” might be regarded as an 
effectual argument in discussions on the quality of instructions and its design. Anticipation of 
problems regarding equivalence was also an argument frequently put forth against Muslim 
denominational schools during out fieldwork. In the next section we will take a closer look on that 
argument.  
Still, the examples picked out above show us the constituents of the argument of segregation, and 
some examples of the discursive contexts in which it arise. First of all, it is held against the 
establishment and/or existence of Islamic denominational schools that they increase the level of 
cultural segregation, in that they decreases the interface between Muslim students and the mainstream 
society, and hence screen off representations, norms and values from the mainstream society. As a 
distinctive, non-common educational environment, it is supposed to be divisive (cf. Halstead & 
McLaughlin 2005). Second, it is also held that they also increase the socio-economical segregation. 
The first argument targets Islamic faiths schools partly in its quality of being denominational (religious 
people are more prone to create closed social environments), partly in its quality of being Islamic 
(Islamic and Christian schools are frequently criticized than other denominational schools), and partly 
because they attracts many migrants who live in areas with a low number of native Swedes. The 
second argument targets Islamic schools mainly because their students mainly are recruited from 
relatively deprived social groups. Still, the arguments are not followed by proposals to shut down 
Islamic denominational schools. They have the character of objections, rather than clear-cut calls for 
prohibitions.  
  
Quality, rule of law and equivalence 
Apart from the risk of social and cultural segregation, objections were also made to Islamic 
denominational schools concerning the quality of the education they offered. The quality was 
questioned, and so was the ability to reach the goals put forward in the national curricula and other 
steering documents. As noted above, this argument was often connected to the goal of equivalence, 
stipulated in the steering documents. Peter was one of the interviewees who expressed doubts in this 
particular issue, in relation to the quality of the instructions offered.  
Peter: Let me put it like this: if the systems of supervision is in function, and if the Swedish 
National Agency of Education, and until now Stockholm municipality … if they can check up on 
whether the schools are law-abiding or not, then there should be no problems at all, but if you 
consider how the supervision of the independent schools has been, then … it was like child’s play. 
The supervision did not function during the 90’s. The schools inspectorate haven’t been around 
for such a long time; the Stockholm municipality had some inspections of their own, but that was 
inspections of the pedagogical content, not about obedience to the law or steering document. 
Without a strong school inspectorate, with a clear authorization, then you run the risk of 
degenerated species, the building of false front, of Potemkin villages.  
Peter does not make his argument fully explicit. In a context where he talks about Islamic independent 
schools and the quality of education in school after the independent school reform, he notes that 
“degenerated species” – i.e. particular schools – will grow up, and that ”Potemkin villages” will be set 
up.
1
 Although he does not explicitly claim that Islamic schools are species of degenerated kind, or fake 
fronts, this remain an implicit message: if the school inspectorate had been working in the way it 
should have, then Islamic denominational schools would “have some problems”. Their capacity to 
offer education by the standards is called into question.  
Some of the objections put forward by Sylvia, the senior civil servant, were similar to Peter’s 
argument. If an independent denominational school follows the set of rules inscribed in the national 
curriculum, and if they provide qualitative instructions in all the mandatory subjects, then, she claims, 
everything is ok, she stated, “but we’re not there yet”. Indirectly and by implication she claimed that 
Islamic independent schools do not provide the kind of education they are assumed to. Still, she was 
not critical to Islamic schools only; her general critical attitude also targeted Christian faith schools. 
And apart from Peter, she clearly stated that she was in favour of Islamic denominational schools in 
general, provided they managed to meet the standards specified in the steering documents, and, above 
all, thus reached the goal of equivalence.  
The argument of quality was also put forward by David, teacher and a leading representative of the 
National Union of Teachers (NUT, Lärarnas Riksförbund) when he outlined the general and official 
stance developed in the organization. He also connected into to the question of equivalence, and hence 
not only the quality of the instructions, but also the question of whether denominational independent 
schools really offered training or instructions in all comprehensive subjects or not, which apparently 
also is a part of the equivalence problem.  
David: In general, we are critical to the development of the Swedish school during the last 20 
years, and the independent schools are a part of this. It is not the same set of rules for independent 
schools as for municipal schools, but that’s on the way of being corrected now … but we don’t 
                                                     
1
 The term “Potemkin villages” is an idiom which refers to a historical myth about the then Russian minister Grigory 
Potemkin According to this myth, there were fake settlements purportedly erected at the direction of Potemkin to fool 
Empress Catherine II during her visit to Crimea in 1787. It is said that Potemkin, who led the Crimean military campaign, 
had hollow facades of villages constructed along the desolate banks of the Dnieper River in order to impress the monarch 
and her travel party with the value of her new conquests, thus enhancing his standing in the empress's eyes. 
  
make any difference between Muslim independent and Christian, but there is a risk connected to 
the independent school system, in so matter that the overall segregation increases. And the lack of 
equivalence is one crucial aspect of the segregation, but there other aspects as well, for instance 
that you choose school in line with your religious beliefs. Still, whether you are Christian or a 
Muslim, you have to follow the rules. And we have been very explicit in that matter, it is of 
uttermost importance to follow the rules that governs the Swedish school system. And this is not 
always the case. And it has been shown on TV, documentaries that has exposed, Christian ... 
extremists, one might say ... Christian independent schools, and recently it has been exposed that 
there also exist Muslim independent schools in which you do not follow the rules. […] We have 
taken a stand; the same rules should apply for municipal schools as well as for independent. And 
we think it is great that the School Inspectorate should inspect even more, in order to check the 
observance of the rules. There has been too much of … lack of observance, we must say. There are 
examples of schools that do not care about the goals set up in the national syllabus, or in the 
national curricula. You don’t have teachings in sexuality and life together, or whatever that is 
censored. For us, it is a matter of lacking equivalence.  
David makes some efforts to point out the general critique put forth by the union. It does not target 
Muslim denominational schools in particular, but also Christian; it does not target religious 
independent schools, but independent schools in general. He thus states that the establishment of 
independent schools in general has increased the social segregation, and that the question of 
equivalence is one crucial aspect of the segregation problem. With a reference to some documentary 
films shown on TV, he implies that religious independent schools are more prone than others to not 
meet the standards pointed out in the steering documents, Christian as well as Muslim. There is a 
general problem with lack of observance of the steering documents among denominational schools, 
David claims, in so much that they do not deliver all the instructions that are specified in the national 
syllabus; the lessons on sexuality is probably not given, he claims. Thus, it is implied that the 
denominational schools do not meet the requirement to deliver instructions equivalent to the national 
standards. But when Peter focus in the alleged lack of quality, David and Sylvia focus on the lack of 
observance to the national syllabus.  
David clearly points out that the lack of observance is a problem in itself. Rules and steering 
documents must be followed, that is their raîson d’être. Moreover, the argument of equivalence is also 
framed within the argument of segregation. The lack of equivalence is a problem in itself, but it also 
because in nurtures segregation. Schools that do not provide instructions in all subjects, and in which 
the quality of the instructions is lacking, do not prepare the students for life after school in a proper 
way, and this deficiency is even more apparent since the students in Muslim independent schools often 
belong to socially underprivileged strata, and live in deprived and stigmatized areas. It might not be 
said that the argument put forth by David above should be categorized as intolerance towards religion 
in education. Still, it is a part of extensive and elaborated argument against Muslim schools, in which 
expressions of intolerance also can be discerned. In the interview with Sarah, the senior representative 
of STU, the connection between abidance by the rules  and the dangers of social segregation got 
explicated in a manifest way, and her arguments and descriptions will be given extensive space in the 
next paragraph.  
Quality, equivalence, freedom of religion and the rights of children 
In the interview with Sarah, the central arguments against the establishment or proliferation of Islamic 
denominational schools was clearly expressed and connected to each other. Moreover, the arguments 
were also clearly connected to the development of Swedish educational policy during the last decades, 
but also to more universal sets of rules and norms. Because of this relatively high level of elaboration, 
and the connectedness to wider normative contexts, we choose to allot some more space for the 
discourse explicated in the interview with Sarah.  
  
After our presentation of the research project, Sarah immediately started off recounting what is her 
version of the history of the Swedish independent school system, and the STU point of view in this 
particular issue. For a long time confessional free schools were a non-issue, they were established on 
larger scale and became a matter of debate only in the middle of the 1990’s. The first wave of free 
schools that came in the beginning of the same decade were followers of those few free schools that 
already existed, namely those who was organized their education in line with progressive pedagogies 
such as Waldorf and Reggio Emilia. The second wave was the confessional schools, among them a big 
group of Muslim schools, but also a large number of Christian schools.  
The first time the STU, Sarah’s employer, acknowledged that confessional free schools has become an 
issue is in 1994, when the new national curricula is implemented. In there, it was stated that the 
independent schools could be organized as confessional, but that the publicly financed municipality 
schools had to be non-confessional. The national curricula for the different school forms differed in 
this matter, and, according to Sarah, a huge number of teachers and members of the union opposed 
this. They thought that all schools should be non-confessional, and Lärarförbundet made a number of 
statements pointing in that direction, although they weren’t too explicit about it (according to Sarah); 
still, their position was that the same rules should apply for the schools, regardless of ownership.  
New debates followed at the turn of the century, prompted by a redraft in the laws and decrees that 
regulates the national school system, Sarah continues, and since then one of the key issues has been 
whether the regulations - and hence conditions - for the public and privates schools should be identical 
or not. According to Sarah, the prevalence of schools not guided by a secular and  general national 
curriculum has been met by apparent disapproval, at least from several union-organized teachers. 
There is a strong opposition against independent schools, and against denominational schools, but not 
specifically against Muslim independent schools. Thus, the objections against Muslim – and other 
denominational – schools is based on a premise of equivalence; the Swedish school system should be 
comprehensive, and the education delivered within in that system, should not deviate too much from 
the secular norm.  
So far, Sarah’s call for equivalence is mainly a call for a general rule system, in which the rules apply 
for everyone, without deviations. But her argument also took the risk of segregation or social division 
into consideration. In this matter, she argued quite forcefully, which we could see above. In her 
answer, Sarah does not pay any attention to the potentially counter-divisive potential of Islamic 
denominational schools. The focus is solely on socio-economic conditions. The main effects are 
considered to be negative; socio-economic segregation is said to follow from the independent school 
system and the right to choose type of school, and the establishment of Muslim denominational 
schools do not change that. Moreover, it is also important to note that Sarah – like, for instance, Sylvia 
– do not promote the closing down of Muslim independent schools. Still, Sarah’s argument reflects a 
pragmatic stance rather than a concern for freedom or religion; she supposes that it would be more or 
less impossible to withdraw the freedom of choice almost twenty years after the right first was 
established.  
Sarah: And then there is another aspect, I can make another contribution. […]  I had a reason to 
check it out, why confessional schools are allowed in Sweden, why they do exist at all […]. And I 
got the task to start digging, and I found a resolution from the UN and all sorts of things. Really, it 
is based on, if I got it right, and if I haven’t forgot anything, it is based on the right of the parents 
to teach your own child. And that is some kind of protection for … minorities […]. We ratified it in 
the fifties or in the sixties. […] But here, in Sweden, we created as school where the children, well, 
where it is possible to choose a path different from the parents. That’s why we have s subject 
called “religion”, not Christianity. So, if you should position the STU in this debate, it could be 
said that we think that the child has the right to choose her or his own path, and it might very well 
be totally different from the parent’s path. If so, you have to create a school which allows you to 
choose that different path. But then, it should not be possible for parents to teach their own 
  
children, of course.  
Fredrik: One of the main tenets behind the comprehensive school? 
Sarah: Yes, very much so. Equivalence, yes. We don’t lose sight of that guiding star, which is the 
inviolable right of the child to choose its own path.  
In this part of the interview discourse, Sarah makes a clear connection between the goal of equivalence 
and the – presumably universal - rights of the child. Here, the goal of equivalence is less connected to 
abidance by the rules, but rather a “guiding star” which directs the attention to the universal rights of 
the child. It is a discourse of human rights, rather than of abidance by the rules. The goal of 
equivalence is not justified pragmatically, but because it follows from attention paid to almost context-
independent (allegedly universal) rights.  
Summary 
In sum, a number of disadvantages with the establishment of Islamic denominational schools are 
expressed. They are allegedly divisive, both culturally and socially, and the quality of their 
instructions is supposed to be inadequate, in relation to the standards explicated in the national 
curriculum and syllabi. It could reasonable be said that Muslim schools are met by suspicion. Still, few 
calls for shutting down of these schools are voiced. It seems that the Muslim denominational schools 
are tolerated in a literal sense: it is accepted, sometimes pragmatically, but not liked. On the other 
hand, it could be said that the provision of a judicial and institutional space for religious minorities to 
establish denominational schools is part of politics of recognition; i.e. an educational policy which, 
under auspicious circumstances might provide the means for religious minorities to receive respect as 
equal and gain admission as normal. As noted above, though, the establishment of Muslim 
independent schools in Sweden does not follow from an introduction of a multiculturalist program, or 
any act of recognition. Rather, it could be described as a by-product of the implementation of New 
Public Management in Swedish educational policy. The introduction of a voucher system provided a 
new opportunity structure for non-governmental organizations with educating ambitions, such as 
Islamic denominations.   
The repugnance or aversion towards Muslim independent schools found in our empirical material 
relate to this political context. For example, most objections to the existence of denominational 
schools implicitly and explicitly relate, to the notion of equivalence, which has been a keyword in 
Swedish educational policy for almost three decades, and signifies on the one hand a demand for 
abidance by the national curriculum and syllabi, and on the other its priority over freedom of choice. 
As  the reproduction of “demos” gains priority over the recognition of “ethnos”, he equalizing and 
integrative objectives of the compulsory school project seem to be alive and kicking, and  the quest for 
recognition of minority beliefs systems is circumscribed.  
(3) Case Study 2: Burqa and Niqab in the everyday life of schools  
In many western European countries, the practice of veiling has been contested and debated for several 
years; and an “arena of passionate controversies about the politics of integration and religious and 
cultural difference” (Sauer 2009:76). For some people, the headscarf has become an icon, and a 
symbol representing a clash between different world-views, rather than a piece of cloth; it could be 
regarded as a symbol for patriarchal repression over women, a threat to the (self-proclaimed) openness 
of the liberal, parliamentary democracy, or as an act of resistance towards an unsympathetic secular 
and sometimes racist hegemony of the mainstream society. As a highly visible sign, the headscarf has 
also become a symbol for the religious of Islam. As such, it is related to at least three policy areas: 
policies of integration, the governance of religious difference, and gender equality (Sauer 2009).  
  
As several authors (i.e. Joppke 2004, Kymlycka 2005, Vasta 2007) has pointed out, the strong reaction 
to the practice of veiling are parallel to the “recent retreat from multiculturalism”, a recent tendency in 
integration policy in many western European countries. Calls for integration have gradually become 
similar to calls for assimilation, and the objectives of toleration and recognition has been downgraded. 
Discussions of religious freedom focus on its limitations, particularly in relation to the practice of 
veiling. The secularization of European states went along with the privatization of religious beliefs, 
and some fear that the visible presence of covered Muslim women in public places might lead to a re-
sacralization of the public sphere, and even threaten the fundamental secular dimension of liberal 
democracy (Sauer 2009).  
Many European societies have regulated the wearing of headscarves in the public sphere, at schools, 
universities, in court rooms or public service jobs. According to Birgit Sauer (2009:77), it is possible 
to discern at least three different approaches to headscarves in Europe: prohibitive, soft or selective 
and non-restrictive approaches. In France, Turkey and some German federal states, where a 
prohibitive approach has gained ground, Muslim body covering is banned in public institutions.
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soft or selective approaches, Sauer describes the prohibitive measures in Sweden, Finland and the 
Netherlands, which bans certain kinds of covering in certain public institutions. The non-restrictive 
approach, finally, is to be found for example in Austria, where body or face coverage are not restricted 
at all. Moreover, Sauer also notes that there is no clear-cut connection between on the one hand 
different approaches to body and/or face coverage, and on the other different institutional settings such 
as citizenship models, church-state relations, or gender regimes. 
In this study, we focus specifically on the veiling practices commonly named Burqa or Niqab, not on 
headscarves in general. Thus, attitudes to the much more common – and often less controversial – 
veiling practice called hijab are not included. The major difference between Burqa and Niqab on the 
one hand, and Hijab on the other, is that the latter leaves the face uncovered (cf. Sauer 2009). The 
reason for this delimitation is empirical: during the last years, the wearing of Niqab and Burqa in 
particular has been intensely debated and strongly contested in Sweden, rather than headscarves in 
general; not the least when it comes to matters of education and the regulation of educational 
institutions. The debate in Sweden differs from those in France, Germany, Belgium, etc; still, the 
distribution of standpoints between proponents and antagonists, and their argumentation, follows 
roughly the same pattern as in other the above mentioned countries.  
This does not mean that the practice of Hijab is more or less uncontroversial in Sweden. For example, 
when two journalists dressed in Hijab was hosting the TV-show “Halal-TV” in 2008 by SVT, the 
national public broadcasting company, an intense debate followed, in which it became obvious that a 
lot of Swedes did not tolerate TV-show hosts dressed in Hijab. Since then, no show has been hosted by 
a women wearing headscarf in Swedish television. Nevertheless, recent debates in mass media and 
elsewhere have focused on Burqa and Niqab, not the least whether it should be prohibited or not to 
cover your face in public.  
The purpose of this study is threefold. First, we will describe the general attitudes among teachers, 
headmasters and other categories of professionals with an interest in educational matters towards the 
practice of wearing Burqa and/or Niqab in public schools. Second, we will describe which arguments 
that are employed among those who are in favor of a prohibition of the abovementioned veiling 
practices. Third, we will analyze the ideological and policy-related underpinnings of those arguments.   
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 It must be note, though, that the prohibiton policy in Germany mostly has been directed towards teachers, in their capacity 
as federal state officials, while more general prohibitons is in force in France and Turkey (Joppke 2007).  
  
The right to wear Burqa or Niqab called in question  
The first nationwide mediated debate on veiling practices of Burqa and Niqab in Sweden took place in 
2003 (Gardell 2010). A couple of young women dressed in Burqa showed up at Burgårdens upper 
secondary school in Gothenburg, which led to some debate and controversy at the school. The teachers 
and the headmaster at Burgården reacted, and the headmaster made an inquiry to the SNEA, and asked 
for a clarification.  
“Students with ‘immigrant background’ is relatively frequent at our school, but this year we have 
for the first time received so called “Burqa”-students, who wears a black, covering dress with a 
veil, and it is only possible to see the eyes of the student – through a gauze. The staff, which 
accordingly is used to immigrant students, has reacted strongly to this, and experiences it as 
unpleasant to teach students whom they can’t identify and hardly make eye contact with. […] I 
have told them that the schools demands to take off the veil during the lessons. Can I do that? Are 
you acquainted with similar cases, and how did one react back then?”(quoted in Hilborn 2003)  
Partly through the inquiry to the SNEA, the case got nationwide attention, and an intense and agitated 
debate followed (Gardell 2010:171). Most of the contributors where severely critical to the practice of 
Burqa or Niqab veiling, and focused mainly to its gender dimension; it was recurrently maintained that 
the practice constituted a patriarchal oppression, which forced women to cover themselves and hide 
(Åberg 2003, Westgård 2003, cf. Gardell 2010). Among the critical voice leading politicians of 
different political colour could be found, such as the then minister of integration and future party 
leader, social democrat Mona Sahlin, who asserted that the purpose of veiling was to “conceal women 
and make them invisible” (Gardell 2010, Ch. 7).3 After some investigation, the SNEA responded the 
inquiry with a memo (Hilborn 2003) to all Swedish schools, in which their appointed investigator, 
Ingegärd Hilborn, acknowledged the headmasters’ right to prohibit Burqa on the local level, in her/his 
own school.  
If the wearing of Burqa, according to a serious judgment, runs the risk cause disturbance, for 
example as quarrel between students, or if other students feel worried or unsafe, or if discussions 
claim of unreasonable amount of time, the school administration may, by means of the general 
school rules, or a decision in the concrete case, prohibit students to wear Burqa at school. […] It 
might [also] be difficult for a teacher who cannot perceive the facial expression of a student to 
find out whether students have understood a question or a statement; in a similar way, the 
interaction between the students may be obstructed. That disposes the school to prohibit the 
wearing of Burqa at school by pedagogical reasons (Hilborn 2003:11).  
The legal matter of this memo never was made clear, as it was neither a law, a decree nor a regulation, 
but nevertheless it seemed to have a steering influence in many schools (see below). The guiding 
principles were held to be in line with the Swedish constitution and the guidelines for the educational 
system, the European convention on human rights and the United Nations convention on the rights of 
the child (on the other hand, it lacked any reference to canonical pedagogical texts, although its 
conclusions relied heavily on some very specific assumption concerning the nature of learning 
processes). Referring to the interpretations of the European convention on religious freedom by 
Swedish professor Reinhold Fahlbeck (2002, 2004), the SNEA asserted that the negative freedom of 
religion (“freedom from religion”) overtrumped the positive (“freedom of religion”), and that the legal 
protection for positive manifestations of religion – such as the wearing of Burqa or Niqab was 
“moderate” in Swedish judicial praxis. Regardless of its unclear legal status, the memo from SNEA 
gained authority, and an (informal) policy of non-toleration was carried through in this matter.  
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 However, the political discourse of the then ruling Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokratiska Arbetarpartiet, SAP) was 
not coherent in this matter. Different opinions were expressed, although the equality argument depicted above held a 
strong position. Nevertheless, their political agency in judicial matters seemed to point in divergent directions.  
  
Some years later, a new debate over Burqa and Niqab occurred in Swedish mainstream media. This 
time, the debate was even more intense and even more drawn-out (Gardell 2010:177). It all started in 
2009, when Alia Khalifa, a 24 years old woman of Egyptian descent, reported her school, Åsö 
vuxengymnasium in Tensta, Stockholm, to the ombudsman against discrimination 
(Diskrimineringsombudsmannen, DO). She claimed that she had been exposed to discrimination from 
her school. The acts of discrimination were related to her Islamic faith, and the belief practices 
entailed. Alia, a practicing Muslim, covered (and still covers) her face with a burqa, and motivated it 
with reference to her Islamic belief. Already after a couple of days at the upper secondary education 
program for childcare, Barn- och fritidsprogrammet, she was explicitly told by the members of the 
school staff that her veiling practice was not allowed at school.
4
 After two weeks, she was told that it 
was forbidden to cover ones face at the school, and that she had to choose between her ways of 
dressing, and to continue at the program. Faced with a threat of suspension, she decided to report her 
school to the DO. The school now stated that Alia could continue at the program as long as her case 
was handled at the ombudsman, provided she lifted the veil in front of the children at the preschool. 
Subsequently, they would find out whether the rules at the school were in line with Swedish law or 
not. Since the dissemination of SNEA’s memo in 2003, the legal situation had changed. The 
legislation on different forms of discrimination – ethnic as well as other forms – had been sharpened. 
In particular, the legal protection from discrimination in educational institutions had been strengthened 
in 2006.  
As mentioned above, Alia Khalifa’s report to the DO led to a reborn and intensified debate on the 
practice of wearing Burqa and Niqab in public places in general, and in schools in particular. As the 
election of 2010 came closer, politicians started to react. In October 2009, two MP’s of the agrarian 
Center party presented a bill for “the prohibition of Burqa and Niqab in society, in schools and 
workplaces” (quoted in Gardell 2010:178). In their bill, they asserted that 
The face of a human being – her eyes, nose and mouth – is her interface to the world and other 
human beings, and imagining an open society where more and more people covers their face, for 
example in public spaces, at work or at school does not seems to be an option for our future. The 
freedom of religions is extremely important and protected by the constitution, but there are some 
limits to it. We think that the boundary is set by the will or imposition to conceal ones face in 
public spaces or at work. An open society ought to consider setting the limit, and we suggest that 
the government investigates this question (Danielsson & Pettersson 2009).  
Moreover, they also claimed that someone has to “dare to discuss the veil as a problem”, in order to 
the right-wing populists of Sverigedemokraterna should not be left alone with this question – thus 
obtain popularity and votes in the coming election. By and by, the liberal party Folkpartiet joined the 
debate, voicing a similar proposition; they put forward that it should be possible for schools 
administrations to prohibit complete veiling such as Burqa or Niqab at schools. “Education is 
communication. Education is premised on the interaction between teachers and pupils. It must be 
possible to see each other faces”, their party leader Jan Björklund (2010, cf. Lundberg 2010, 
Scherlund 2010) asserted.  
In a public debate during the same election campaign, broadcasted in public service radio, then Social 
democratic party leader Mona Sahlin and Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt, leader of liberal 
conservative Moderaterna party, had a heated discussion. Reinfeldt claimed that he “does not believe 
in a society where women aren’t allowed to appear [in public]”, and that he “doesn’t want to see 
women in Burqa in the [Stockholm] underground”, and “wants to press back those who sympathize 
with the covering of women”, although he stressed that this was his personal opinions, and that he 
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 The account of the case is based on Alia’s own presentation in an in article in the Swedish daily Expressen (Khalifa 2009). 
However, it does not differ in any significant way from other accounts that I hace received during the fieldwork.  
  
does not want any legislation against the practices of Burqa or Niqab (Sundén Jelmini 2010, Karlsson 
& Hedlund 2010). Sahlin, still critical to the practice in question, claimed that veiling is an instance of 
oppression against women. She also dismissed a prohibition, and criticized the French anti-veiling 
legislation for being stigmatizing (Karlsson & Hedlund 2010). Lars Ohly, leader of the leftist party 
Vänsterpartiet, was one of the leading politicians who distinctly opposed a prohibition (Ramqvist 
2009).  
Without any doubt, the practice of complete veiling was one of key debates in the 2010 election in 
Sweden, and it has been one of the major issues in the politics of integration during the last five years 
(Malm 2009; Gardell 2010). As noted above, it has been discussed both in relation to gender and 
education. The positions in the debate have been more or less overlapping with those in other western 
European countries, with the exception that it focused almost solely on the practices of Burqa and 
Niqab, leaving the dress-code of Hijab in the background; obviously, the covering of faces was one 
central ingredients of the debate, in 2003 as well as in 2009-2010 (cf. Hilborn 2003, Danielsson & 
Pettersson 2009, Björklund 2010). On the one hand, there was a claim for recognition of different 
veiling practices motivated by an Islamic faith, which in the main is motivated with references to the 
freedom of religion (Khalifa 2009, Ramqvist 2009). The support for this position was mainly to be 
found in the political left (cf. Ramqvist 2009, Munther 2010), but also among a quite narrow fringe of 
liberals (Bauhn 2010), and a small number of conservatives (Poirier Martinsson 2010).  
On the other hand, the opposition against the practice of complete veiling and/or the support for 
different prohibitive measures was based on notions of gender equality, secular freedom from religion 
(cf. Gardell 2010), Swedish traditions and standards, and/or social interaction, together with 
pedagogical considerations. Thus, it was claimed that the practices of Burqa and Niqab constituted 
central elements in the repression of women in patriarchal cultures (Pekgul 2011, cf. Lorenzoni 2010); 
that manifest religious dressing should not be visible in public places (Azmeh Rasmussen 2009, 
Åkesson & Ekeroth 2010), and that veiling is alien to traditional Swedish mores (Dervishi 2009), such 
as a “traditionally” Swedish benevolent attitude towards gender equality (Pekgul 2011). It was also 
said that complete veiling obstruct social interaction at public places, workplaces (Danielsson & 
Pettersson 2009), and – in a general sense – in open societies (Alcala 2009), as well education process 
at schools (Kjöler 2009, Levander 2009, Björklund 2010). The opposition against the practices of 
Burqa and Niqab, and the calls for a prohibition, was voiced all over the political spectrum, from the 
Social Democrats to the Liberal Conservatives and Christian Democrats; needless to say, right-wing 
anti-migration populists such as the Sweden Democrats were among those who voiced their opposition 
most powerful (cf. Åkesson & Ekeroth 2010).  
Apart from the debates at the internet, in media and among politicians, and intellectuals – what do we 
know about the general public opinion towards the practices of Burqa and Niqab? In their yearly study 
Mångfaldsbarometern (Barometer of Diversity), sociologists Orlando Mella, Irving Palm and Kristina 
Bromark (2011) measure the attitudes to different kinds of veiling in public places, such as schools 
and working places. From the 2011 survey, they conclude that the resistance in Sweden against the 
Burqa and the Niqab is compact but slightly lower level compared to 2010. Thus, 88.8 % and 86.2 % 
of the population find it (totally or partly) unacceptable to wear Burqa and Niqab, respectively, at 
school or at work (Mella et al 2011:30), whereas 69.0 % and 64.6 %, respectively, find it (totally or 
partly) unacceptable to wear Burqa and Niqab at other public places. The opposition against using 
Chador at school or at work is smaller, and decrease when comparing the years 2010 and 2011. The 
issue of using the Chador in other public places may also even less resistance. The Shayla and Hijab 
practices are assessed by a majority as acceptable for use in school or at work, and the acceptance is 
even higher in other public places.  
Obviously, the covering of ones face remains a threshold, when it comes to questions of acceptance 
and recognition. A general attitude of non-tolerance towards complete veiling is widespread in 
  
Sweden - and it has been around for some years now, according to earlier studies of Mella and Palm 
(2008, 2009, 2010). It might be the case that this wide-spread non-tolerant attitude explains why the 
question of Burqa and Niqab at school received large-scale attention during the 2010 electoral 
campaign. As noted above, it was commonly argued among liberal and conservative right-wing parties 
that it was necessary to “dare to discuss the veil as a problem” (Danielsson & Pettersson 2009, cf. 
Björklund 2010), in order not to let the right-wing populists of Sverigedemokraterna be left alone with 
this question. Whether this claim for discursive courage should be interpreted as an ambition to extend 
the liberal notion of freedom from religion, or as a concession to the anti-multiculturalist project of 
radical right-wing populism is still under debate, and a way to increase the number of votes from 
xenophobic strata of the electorate, is still under debate.  
Regardless of their motives, it seems like that the political agenda of the Swedish liberals and 
conservatives are brought closer to the radical right –wing populists’ in this matter. This signifies a 
change of course among mainstream Swedish political parties; since the beginning of the 90’s, the 
issue of migration and multiculturalism hasn’t received as much attention as in many other western 
European Countries during election campaigns (Dahlström & Esaiasson 2009, Rydgren 2010, for a 
different view, cf. Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup 2008), then signalling a dismissive approach to the 
endeavours of the radical right-wing populists. This could imply that the political ontology of the latter 
has gained further influence in Sweden. Nevertheless, if the rejection of veiling practices such as 
Burqa or Niqab is to be regarded as an act of non-toleration (cf. Dobbernack & Moodod 2011), then 
the political agenda of the Swedish (non-radical) right clearly showed some proofs of non-toleration 
during the 2010 electoral campaign.  
However, by the end of 2010, the DO had completed their investigation, and made their verdict 
official. In an article in Sweden’s biggest and most influential daily, Dagens Nyheter, head of DO 
Katri Linna published an article, in which she explained (her interpretation of) the legal situation. In 
sum, she claimed that the exclusion of a student from education because of the wearing of Niqab 
conflicts with the present legislation on discrimination (Linna 2010). Still, DO choose not to take the 
case to court, since the complainant had reached a compromise with the school. Thus, no precedent 
was in sight in in the nearest future. Partly because of the latter, and partly because of the content of 
the decision, the verdict was contested, debated and criticized (Hellqvist 2010, Åkesson & Ekeroth 
2010).  
What is wrong with Burqa and Niqab?  
As noted above, different categories of interviewees were approached during the fieldwork; teachers, 
headmasters, union representatives, representatives for Islamic organizations, politicians, municipality 
civil servants and lawyers - each one of them representing different professional perspectives on Niqab 
and Burqa. The significance of the practice of veiling varied, according to professional activity. 
Already from the outset, though, it might be said that a certain convergence in standpoints could be 
noted. Just a few persons expressed values or attitudes deviating from the main tendency. This study 
suggests that the discourse on Niqab and Burqa expressed within the realm of the Swedish educational 
system – at the primary and secondary levels – moulds up to a quite homogenous phenomenon. Later 
on, the significations and the logic of that particular discourse will be outlined.  
The relevance of the media debate 
The first convergence is to be found in the case that almost every interviewee working in schools call 
attention to the fact that they never met a student in Burqa or Niqab. For instance, Martin, a teacher at 
an upper secondary school, points out that he never had a pupil dressed in Burqa and Niqab; “I have 
seen them in the schoolyard, in the area, but I never have had them in here” – although Martins’ 
  
school is situated in the area which has the highest proportion of migrants in the Stockholm town 
district, among them a large number of Somali migrants. Ann, who teaches at a primary school, but 
exclusively at the highest forms, notes that she never had any pupil with a Niqab or a Burqa, although 
she has been working in areas with a high proportion of migrants for at least a decade; “we don’t have 
any veiled girls except for those in Hijab, I have never experienced that”. Lena, who has been working 
as headmaster in one of the most “immigrant-dense” suburbs in Stockholm for almost 15 years, said 
that she “never had one single student dressed in Burqa, and only one in Niqab”, Thus, it must already 
from the outset be said that the interviewees’ experience of meeting young women dressed in Burqa or 
Niqab was strictly limited.  
Moreover, a few of them also stated explicitly that the media debate exaggerated the relevance of the 
above mentioned veiling practices to the everyday life at school. They claimed that Burqa and Niqab 
is not at all common in Swedish problem, it is a social phenomenon which you rarely, if at all, meet. 
For example, John, who is a headmaster, notes that the public debate, according to him, is distorted.  
Fredrik: But do you consider it to be an issue, does young women in Burqa or Niqab ever show 
up?  
John: No, it is not an issue. But from what I know, nationwide, it is not an issue at all, no matter of 
which kind of socioeconomic area it might be ... it is a non-issue, except for in the national 
political debate.  
Fredrik: How and when do you encounter this matter – except for when it is debated in media?  
John: In media, that’s where I take notice of it, it is right there it ever shows up. But it spreads out, 
it rubs off on … in discussions among school administratives, maybe not at my school, but between 
headmasters, in different contexts … in further education classes, in conferences, that’s where it 
shows up, mainly with an air of ridicule added, as a non-issue, as if it is slightly pathetic that such 
a media hype on a question which is non-existent.  
Fredrik: So, that is the most pronounced opinion?  
John: At least among those I meet. But I mostly meet Stockholm headmasters, or … maybe not. I 
do meet headmasters from all parts of Sweden, but above all Stockholm headmasters - and over 
here, it’s like that. You take notice of the media coverage, but whit a scornful sneer. […] And 
among those headmasters who still want to discuss it, they consequently regard it as a symbolic 
issue, rather than a practical problem, as is it is a matter of drawing a symbolic boundary, “you 
cannot go further”. 
John is very critical of the ways in which the veiling practices are discussed in media, in particular 
when it comes to its relevance for educational questions; “it is a non-issue … it is not an issue at all” 
to which “an air of ridicule [is] added”. No other interviewee develops such a strong critique. Also, the 
opinions on whether or not it is worthwhile to actually discuss those practices at great length differed. 
Some of the interviewees, as Peter, upper secondary school teacher and union representative, disagree 
with the standpoint put forth by John; he claims that “it was necessary to discuss” the practice in 
question, since it touched upon some serious matters such as justice, power and the public presence of 
religion in society. Peter admits that never met a young girl completely veiled in his classroom, and 
that his standpoints on whether it should be prohibited or permitted to dress like that “definitely not 
[comes] from personal experience”.   
Thus, the school professionals and other interviewees questioned whether the scope of the debate put 
at disposal in media corresponded to its importance. On the other hand, most interviewees - with very 
few exceptions - thought that it the practice of complete veiling “has to be discussed”, to put in the 
phrasing of Peter quoted above, and expressed a number of objections against wearing Niqab or Burqa 
at school. And even though some of the topics from the media debate were dismissed, could some 
clear and legible instances of disapproval be discerned. The dismissal of the media debate was not an 
expression of acceptance; rather, it was call for bringing the professional dimension to the fore. And, 
as we will see below, this did not always bring about an attitude of recognition or tolerance.  
  
The problem of identification 
The main arguments against the practice of wearing Burqa or Niqab in the Swedish school could be 
summed up below three separate headings: matters of identity, communication and gender. The 
second was the one most forcefully spelled out. On the other hand, the question gender and equality, 
which was - as seen above - so frequent in the debate on the internet, was quite seldom explicated. 
Objections relating to identification and communication were predominant. In addition to the 
arguments against complete veiling, a number of interviewees also questioned the wide applicability to 
the freedom of religion. They claimed that other rights had an overriding importance, and gained 
superiority over the claims for religious freedom.  
Let me begin with a description of the first case – how issues of identity and identifications made up 
an argument for not permitting complete veiling in school, thus suggesting restrictions in the freedom 
of religion. Still, it must also be noted but some of teachers recognized possible solution to the 
problem of identification, thus implying the demands for confirmation of personal identity and 
religious freedom could be met simultaneously – is someone was prepared to cover the eventuality of 
costs. For instance, Martin, the upper secondary school teacher that we also quoted above, claims that 
there is practical dimension that has to be clarified:  
Martin: The practical dimension, concerning identification – really, just who is present in the 
classroom? That’s the big issue. […] In general, I think, in an educational system, you must 
show … who you are. You should do that. Just because we are civil servants that do the marking, 
marking that is irrevocable. Period! We can hardly change them ourselves. 
Fredrik: It is an exercise of public authority? 
Martin: Yes. And then, you want to be sure that it is the right person.  
Peter, the other upper secondary school acknowledged the same problem of identification:  
Peter: It would be a quite strange society, if you could just go around and … well, if I went around 
town with my balaclava, which I wear when I go skating and it’s freezing … I would probably 
have a lot of problems, for example if I had to prove my identity. And my wife, she’s a nurse, she 
says that there are some problems connected to it, in different situations … and that some of those 
in Burqa take an advantage of it. I don’t in which situations, at the driver’s license test maybe, etc. 
So, behind the religious norm, or protected by it, you can get into some mischief. In every group, 
you’ll find some individuals prepared to take advantage of such things. […] And I think that most 
[of my colleagues] would demand the school to put the foot down. The norm system of the school 
demands that all students are identifiable, and possible to interpret, when it comes to the facial 
expressions. Ok, it is not on the societal level, to stipulate exactly how people should dress, but the 
school is a world in itself, where … a certain minimum level of … what concerns so to speak 
personal … personal expression, well you know what I mean, must be guaranteed.  
Lars, the political advisor at the liberal Folkpartiet party, expressed a similar fear:  
Lars: It is also discussed, some kind of uncertainty, whether you know or not who actually is 
sitting in front of you, or if it is someone else who showed up, I mean, if we talk about the Burqa 
anyway. A lot of people think it is unpleasant with someone who hides her face. You’re sitting 
together in a group, having a discussion, and teacher is at front, by the desk, and then, there is one 
person … you do not know, does she take part in the discussion or not? Does she listen? Is she 
attentive?  
First of all, the interviewees put forth an argument closely related to the activity of the school, and its 
quality of public institution: complete veiling cannot be tolerated, since the teachers must be able to 
identify the student. He or she must know which students are present in the classroom, or whose 
examination is to be marked. Even so, Martin recognizes it as an exercise of public authority. In 
Peter’s case, the quest for identification obtains an almost profound meaning: the personal character 
behind or dimension of the expression must be secured. Secondly, and related to the latter, it is 
  
claimed that the specific conditions at the school make it possible to circumvent the freedom of 
religion. Thirdly, reference to diverse “problems” outside schools are made, and some suspicion is 
thrown on “some” person employing the practice concerned in order to obtain illegitimate advantages. 
Once again, implicating misuse and hidden mischief is employed as a discursive strategy. Lastly, we 
can also note that the argument of identification mergers together with the argument of 
communication: do I know with whom I am talking? Whose knowledge is expressed in the saying?  
The primarily school teacher Ann developed a similar standpoint, but she also recognized an objection 
to her own argument, when she was elaborating on it, in relation to the case of Alia Khalifa (cf. 
above).  
Ann: In general, I’m not hostile to immigrants, and I think that most things are ok, I mean, I do a 
lot of stuff which other people think are strange, according to their culture, but then I thought, 
when I heard about it [the case of Alia Khalifa], if you are covered a lot, and even wear gloves, 
then I think, if you work with kids, who are used to it, and have known it, then it is something else, 
but if you never has experienced it, then it could be frightening for children. So, I was rather 
provoked. I was thinking about it. If she could teach in that dress, then I could teach in a Father 
Christmas mask … Father Christmas at Christmas Eve; that is something positive, still it could be 
frightening, because you can’t see the features of his face, any motion … so, then I thought: if she 
could teach in one of those [Burqas], then I could teach in a Father Christmas mask. But then 
again, that is also interesting … if I had a student who covered all the way, with a Burqa, I don’t 
think it would be a problem, because I’d get to know her, and recognize her voice. I would 
recognize her anyway, so … i had some objections, thinking about doing other each other’s exams, 
and stuff like that, with some cheating involved, but … if it were my student, I would recognize her, 
I am her teacher for four years, that’s a long relationship, and it wouldn’t be ruined because of 
this. It would take some time to establish the relation, but it wouldn’t be ruined.  
So, although the identification argument is spelled out, a counterargument is also developed. The 
enduring quality of the relation between teacher and student makes it possible, according to Ann, to 
identify a student, although she’s dressed in a Burqa. Linn, one of the students at the teacher 
education, developed a similar argument, although more forcefully:  
Linn: Then we could go on and shut down schools for blind as well, I mean, they can’t see each 
other, can they? I think this question is so ridiculous, and since when did we have to see each 
other to actually know each other? There is so many ways communicate.  
   
Apart from the pro- and contra arguments developed in relation to the matter of identification, we 
could also take notice of an element of ridicule in Ann’s discourse; she is comparing the veiling 
practice of Burqa with a Father Christmas mask, thus delegitimizing a possible claim for freedom of 
religion by comparing Islamic religious belief practices with highly secular traditions devoid of any 
transcendent dimension. Thus, the argument based on the problems of identification is repeatedly 
articulated in a discursive framing where the practice of complete veiling is delegitimized, through 
ridicule or allusions to diffuse threats. However, the argument in itself does not give rise to any clear-
cut calls for prohibition. The limit to tolerance is hard to detect in this matter, as the calls for 
prohibition is implicated rather than explicated. 
The problem of communication  
The other “serious question” that came upfront seemed to be less open to negotiation and solutions, 
though. The most commonly voiced reason arguing against the practice of wearing Burqa or Niqab in 
school, and thereby implying the need for a prohibition, was that complete veiling practices was 
supposed to constitute a serious obstacle for communication, and by reason of that making difficult or 
even impossible the learning processes that the teachings at school aimed at.  
  
One of those who voiced this argument was Peter, one of the upper secondary education teachers. 
Taking his own professional attitude as a vantage point for the argument against Burqa and Niqab in 
school, he calls attention to the fact that pupils express themselves partly verbally and partly in other 
ways, through their facial expressions and intonation, which always try to acknowledge during 
teaching. Peter refers to general linguist findings, which – according to him - indicate that humans 
communicate in three different ways: with the content of your words, your intonation and your facial 
expression; and that it is fundamental to make eye contact with the pupil or the student.  
Peter: My fundamental attitude, as a teacher, is that students partly express themselves verbally, 
but partly also … everything possible from facial expressions and intonation and so on. Linguists 
talk about three different areas of communication – first, the things that you do with your voice, 
second, things that you do … intonation and so on, and for me, it is obvious that you must see the 
eyes of the student, you must be sure of that you have a specific student in front of you, and not her 
sister, and right there, there’s the limit, for me, in my profession. I must be able to see, to take 
notice of all linguistic expressions from the student I’m dealing with, otherwise, you feel a bit 
handicapped as a teacher, limited in you professional practice. 
Fredrik: In which way 
David: Well, you can’t interpret the reactions of the student. I teach in Swedish and English, and 
when it comes to asking questions in the classroom, and keep a discussion going, it is a matter 
of … respect for the students, to let them in if you think that they got something to say, and to let 
go, if they are under pressure. […] And when the students interact between themselves, you know 
from the way they communicate non-verbally, if there is something wrong. So, professionally, it 
[the Burqa] is a barrier.  
Moreover, the concerns of identity and communication are intertwined, according to this argument; 
you have to be sure of that you communicate with the student, and not her sister, Peter claims, if you 
can’t see the face of the person that you are communicating with, you are handicapped as a teacher 
and limited in your professional, educational agency. You cannot interpret the reactions of the student. 
Today, interaction with the student means that you have to let him or her into discussion when you 
apprehend that he or she has something to say, and knows what to say, and to let her or him go, when 
the pupil does not know what to say. The same goes for the interaction between the pupils; the 
communication is also reliant on non-verbal expressions. Strictly professional, the niqab and the burqa 
constitute a barrier for communication.  
David, former teacher and union representative of higher station at the NUT (National Union of 
Teachers) argued along a similar line. He claimed that the issue at stake had a clear pedagogical 
dimension. An important part of the communication between human beings, in general as well as in 
school, David stated, is non-verbal communication, for example communication through reading and 
interpreting facial expressions and bodily movements. Thus, it might be possible read and interpret 
and understand the facial expressions of each other. It is an important part of human communication, 
David continues, which might signal something important.  
David: The NUT has made a number of statements, in which we emphasized the importance of 
actually see the face of the students, to connect, it is important that you actually connect to the 
students, that you have a close relation to the student, which is rendered more difficult when the 
student wears a Burqa. Or Niqab. […] It’s the communicative aspect, to faculty to communicate 
does not only reside in verbal and written language, but also in facial expressions and movements, 
there are many different aspects of communication, and a very important part, which signals a lot, 
is the facial expression. You really don’t know how you are perceived by a person on the phone. 
It’s a matter of restricted communication, that’s why you often want a personal meeting, an 
exchange. Communication with facial expressions and bodily movements makes it easier to grasp 
what someone is actually saying. As a teacher, you do want to know whether a student really 
understands or not, you can hear a person say ”yes”, but out of the facial expression, you can tell 
that he or she doesn’t understand at all.  
  
Thus, according to David, the practice of Burqa and Niqab constitutes and obstacle for the enactment 
of teaching professions. Moreover, it is not only a personal opinion, but a standpoint expressed by the 
NUT in the ongoing public debate on educational policy. Until present, the NUT has not yet promoted 
any particular standpoint in some of the juridical matters, for example whether or not it should be 
possible for school administrations to issue local prohibitions on the practice of Burqa and/or Niqab – 
or to ban them all over. They had awaited the verdict from the DO, and when the latter decided not to 
take the case to court, they were quite discontented. Although the DO were clear regarding the legal 
status of local prohibitions, the NUT asked for a court ruling –mainly because their members 
requested clear and unequivocal guidelines.   
Lena, one of the headmasters, claimed that the practice of Burqa “conflicts with the basic principles of 
the teacher profession”. You become a teacher “because you have an interest for human 
communication”, but since “it is hard to communicate with someone who covers her face”, this 
fundamental conflict arises. Even the interviewees working outside school stressed the importance of 
communication, for example the civil servants Ibrahim and Sylvia. “The Burqa is the border line”, 
Ibrahim states, “it is too much, even for my taste, as a migrant from a Muslim country”, and Sylvia 
continues, “Yes, because everything is based on the contacts we have with each other, you ought to 
know with whom you are talking. But the hijab does not constitute any problem [in that sense]”. “It is 
a problem of communication”, Lars, the political advisor at Folkpartiet claimed, “you can’t 
communicate as usual, face to face, facial expressions and all that”.  
Thus, the wearing of Burqa and Niqab is met with opposition in this particular matter. No other 
standpoint is as common in this empirical material as this one: the practice of complete veiling is 
regarded as not compatible with the general conditions of instruction in primary and secondary 
schooling. It might be said that  the attitudes and demands are always phrased in the positive (“the 
students have to show their faces”) but almost never negatively (“Burqa and Niqab should be 
banned”). Moreover, in this specific matter, a number of interviewees – such as Ibrahim and Sylvia, 
see above - made a distinction between Burqa and Niqab on the one hand, and Hijab on the other. 
Since the latter did not constitute a problem of communication, it was not considered to be 
controversial or blameworthy; “the scarf [hijab] had never been a topic of discussion”, Sarah noted in 
her description of the internal discussions of the STU. “That’s a big difference”, Alice – one of the 
students – noted; “as long as I can see the face, I remain calm”. Still, it has to be emphasized that it is 
the alleged problems of communication which most frequently motivate the manifestations of non-
tolerance against complete veiling.  
The gender dimension and other less explicated arguments 
Thirdly, some interviewees made some objections to the wearing of Burqa and Niqab because they 
considered it to be in conflict with dominant norms and values on gender equality. As noted above, 
this viewpoint was not expressed as often in this material as in the popular and mediated discourse on 
complete veiling. David, trustee at the NUT, developed a more explicit opinion on the relation 
between Burqa, Niqab and gender equality:  
David: We always try to focus on the pupil, top the pupil at the center of attention, because the 
well-being of the pupil is always of most importance, and the right to education, and the right to 
instructions. And then you have to solve all the other issues, at the side. But it is a complication, 
the … the freedom of religion, which I think that you should have, at the same time as we have a 
gender equality discussion in Sweden, equality between the sexes, and … it is of uttermost 
importance that teachers signals the right stuff to the students. And of course, there is a 
complication, if we have a teachers all covered up in a Niqab, what kind of message is conveyed, 
about gender equality? You might think that there is a clash between two different but equally 
reasonable standpoints. One the one hand, our struggle in Sweden for equality between the sexes, 
on the other hand, our understanding of and the rights of minorities to practice their religion. And 
  
that is a very tricky question, and we had some expectations that the Ombudsman on 
discrimination should help us, with their investigation.  
Rather than objecting to the presence of students dressed in Niqab or Burqa, David calls the veiling 
among teachers in question. Thus, he deviates slightly from the main themes of the Swedish debate, 
since it most often focus on complete veiling in schools in general, and not among teachers. Still, his 
objection has some bearing on the case of Alia Khalifa (cf. above), since she was a student at a 
teachers education program. David states that the presence of a teacher in Niqab indirectly 
communicates a message to the students, whose content it add odds with dominant notions of gender 
equality in Sweden. The constituents of the clash of values are not explicated, though. The ways in 
which the practice Niqab collides with the allegedly Swedish standards of quality is not spelled out at 
all – although gender equality is inscribed in a Swedish Self-presentation (“our struggle in Sweden for 
equality between the sexes”).  
The implicit nature of David’s argument is parallel to the ways in which Peter, teachers at upper 
secondary level, develops his argument. He claims that the wearing of Burqa and Niqab puts 
“important questions” up front, not the least since “it would gain a lot of attention, if a women in 
Burqa shows up in my classroom”, first and foremost the question of “the power relation between the 
sexes”. In order to clarify the relation between “important questions” and veiling practices, Peter 
emphasizes that he throughout his professional action always has tried to set up a social environment 
in the classroom, where it is feasible for everyone to participate (“bli delaktiga”). Still, he does not put 
it explicit in which way the presence of a Burqa affects gender relations. He just notes that it probably 
would affect the gendered power relations in the classroom. Although only implicated by Peter, a 
theme frequent in the media debate is seems to take shape here: the practice of wearing Burqa or 
Niqab is at odds with established conceptions of gender equality. But when it comes the making clear 
of what could possibly be right or wrong, in an elaborated, normative way, Peter takes a step back. He 
admits that his judgments are strictly personal, and derived from a context not related to school or 
teaching practices.  
If not solely focusing on gender relation, we will discover a similar, implicit normative stand taken by 
Martin, another teacher active at the upper secondary level. He states that he’s quite often are prone to 
reflect on issues such as migration, traditions, and the traditions that already are present in the country, 
and his general attitude is that cultural diversity and mixing is a good thing, when you adapt “the best 
of every culture”. Nevertheless, he questions the general purpose of wearing a Burqa, and he regards it 
as a provocation. Those who wear it, and claims it is a product of their free will, does so with a 
purpose wants to provoke and challenge, Martin says, they want to “provoke and test the democracy”. 
The greatest weakness of democracy, he continues, is its openness: everything is permitted, even 
undemocratic viewpoints. And that perspective of democracy, Martin has no problem with the 
phenomenon; he doesn’t bother whether people are “strolling around naked on the town or covered by 
a Burqa or Niqab”, he says.  
Still, Martin is not only neutral to the practice of veiling. He also claims that the wearing of Burqa and 
Niqab “send signals”, although Martins does not clarify what kind of signals they send, he also says 
that the women in question makes him think of hooligans who run around the town in order to destroy, 
with their faces covered wearing balaclavas. “But that’s my personal connotation”, Martin admits, and 
he adds that he thinks that those who don’t want to show their face have “mischief in their mind”, 
which they are trying to hide away. It is not necessarily true, he points out, but it is nevertheless his 
feeling.  
The discourses of above all Martin and Peter share some commonalities. As already mentioned, an 
implicit morality is expressed. There are no clear statements on what is good or bad, right or wrong, or 
normal or deviant. All the same, some rejections and dislike come to the surface. The veiling practices 
at stake are implicitly coupled with hooliganism, destruction, hidden mischief, provocations or even 
threats to democracy, and feelings of alienation. Of course, it does not make sense to claim that Martin 
  
and Peter actually state that women in Burqa, for example, are prone to destruction or a threat to 
democracy. Rather, I suggest that we may distinguish the outlines of a “semantic field”, in which there 
is an affinity between some of the significations. Chains of metonymic and/or synonymic relations are 
linked together. For example, “veiling” is related to “the hidden”, “the hidden” is related to “hidden 
mischief”, “hidden mischief” is related to “hooliganism” and “destruction”; moreover, “veiling” is 
also related to “provocations”, which also is related to “provocations against democracy”. In order to 
use a concept developed by the Swedish ethnologist Per-Markku Ristilammi (1994), we may discern a 
“dark poetry” at play here, implying there is something fishy about Burqa and Niqab.  
As noted above, it may do not make sense to claim that the chains of metonymic or synonymic 
relations outlined above represent the values, attitudes or norms of the teachers interviewed. As an 
instance of a discourse analysis, the mapping out of a semantic field does not claim to represent such 
phenomena or entities. Rather than depicting intentions or instances of an individual agency, the 
analytic strategy of mapping out a semantic field intends to outline some features of the “frame of 
reference” that enclose the statements of the persons in the study.  
Thus, objections to the practices of Burqa and Niqab premised on notions of gender equality could be 
found in our empirical material. Still, they were not as frequent and as explicated as in mainstream 
media debates. On the contrary, the arguments are quite implicit, as for example to ones quoted above. 
Thus the construction of n dominated Islamic, middle-eastern femininity, and a corresponding 
dominant, patriarchal masculinity, which is such a common motif in many Western discourses on 
gender relations in Islamic and/or Middle Eastern societies (Scott 2007, cf. Spivak 1988), is neither 
particularly frequent nor elaborated at length in this material. On the other hand, we find a discourse 
on veiling practices in which manifest objections aren’t spell out, but rather communicated indirectly, 
for example through the establishment of metonymic or synonymic chains, thus conjuring up a frame 
of reference in which the practice of veiling tends to be related to deprecating or negatively valued 
objects or phenomena.  
The practice of veiling and the everyday life in schools  
  
Obviously, practices of veiling are imbued with different meanings, not least Burqa and Niqab. For 
some, it signifies reverence for God (Karlsson Minganti 2007), or resistance to hegemonic 
secularization and/or the (racist) prejudices of the majority (Yuval-Davies 1994); for others, it 
signifies oppression of women, support of terrorism and/or other threats to the parliamentary 
democracy (cf. Scott 2007). In our empirical material, objections to the practices of Burqa or Niqab 
was now and then articulated within in a discourse which also contained chains of synonyms and/or 
metonyms which established associative connections between the veils and hidden mischief, threats 
and provocations. This strategy for producing implicit meaning must not be overlooked. In a slightly 
more explicit way, though, Burqas and Niqabs were also discussed in relation to other phenomena 
which also brought the questions of religiously motivated practices in the Swedish schools system to 
the fore. In general terms, the practice of veiling could be interpreted as an expression of “negotiated 
participation”; on the one hand, it is a request to hang on to a religious culture, and on the other hand, 
it is an expression of a willingness to become integrated and participate on equal terms with the 
majority population in important spheres of society. The first part becomes a necessary condition to 
fulfil the second part. 
As noted above, the goal of equivalence was often referred to among our interviewees, when 
criticizing the establishment of Muslim denominational schools. In most cases implicitly, but 
sometimes explicitly, it was stated that the right to equivalent education all over Sweden was more 
important than the rights inherent in the freedom of religion, and that the former should gain priority 
over the latter, if they clashed. Moreover, the goal of equivalence was also referred to on many other 
  
occasions during the interviews, when it came to the matter of mapping out the limits of religious 
freedom. In this context, it became evident that the quest for equivalence relied on two legs – on the 
one hand emphasizing the necessity to abide by the laws and the national curriculum, on the other 
hand the aspiration to maximize the equality of opportunities. John, who worked as a headmaster in a 
primary school, was among whom those emphasized the centrality of the national curricula: 
John: The content of the national curricula is clear. The school system should be non-
confessional, which means that we can’t take part in religious festivals, if it isn’t for educational 
purposes. If it’s for an educational purpose, then it is put in a context, it’s not just because it’s that 
time of the year, it’s because you study a particular religion, the tradition of that religion, and the 
belief practices of that religion. So, to remove the festival of Advent, that was an easy task, it was 
the obvious thing to do, from the viewpoint of the national curriculum - which also is right from a 
pragmatic viewpoint, in that kind of area [an area with many Muslim residents]. You just remove 
the problem. But a quest for not taking part in instructions on religion, or, which happened me 
today, a request not to attend to the sex instructions, […] that’s different. That’s tricky. It is 
considerably more difficult to act rational, because there we have a law which I, as a civil servant, 
am entrusted to maintain, viz. that every kid should take part, and reach the specified course 
objectives.  
On this point, the opinions expressed reached a consensus. The centrality of the law and the national 
curricula was crucial. For example, Mehdi, the headmaster of the Islamic denominational primary 
school, explained at great length that the curriculum of his schools in every detail followed the 
national curriculum, and the specific Islamic content consisted of additions to the compulsory subjects. 
One of the reasons for emphasizing the demand to follow the national curriculum was that many 
teachers and headmasters acknowledged the too frequent prevalence of exceptions.  
Lena, one of the other headmasters, noted for example that some religiously motivated demands had 
been raised from parents, above all “when it comes to modify education and instructions”, “notably 
when parents wants to exempt their children from instructions”, above all in three subjects: music, 
physical education and natural science. In general, she did not meet those demands, though. She 
emphasized that her standpoint was motivated on grounds of principle: “it is a matter of equivalence 
and legality; all children has equal rights to education, the same syllabus, and the instructions which 
are inscribed in the national curriculum”. Lena’s argument is central to this matter, and illustrates a 
frequently expressed opinion: exempts from instructions are generally not tolerated or accepted, and 
the reason for this refusal is the evident deviation from the principle of equivalence.  
Still, some adjustments were made in order to facilitate for the enactment of religious belief practices, 
when no significant clashes were discerned. More or less every interviewee working at a school 
reported that they almost without exemption managed to arrange the scheme so that teachers’ seminars 
were held by the time of the Eid festival at the end of Ramadan, thus scheduling for an “unofficial” 
Eid school holiday.  
Quite often, the argument of equivalence was entailed by - and gained rhetoric support from - 
narratives of personal experience (Labov 1972) or hypothetic “semi-narratives” which illustrated not 
only the clash between different rights, but also between different generations of migrants. When 
Sarah, the senior official at the STU, called attention to the fact that many members of her union 
oppose exemptions permitted by headmaster, she employed this discursive strategy.  
Sarah: They have a major problem with headmasters that exempt students from instructions. They 
[the teachers] are the ones who has to pick up the fight, when the parents wants the kids to be 
exempted from the camp school, “there’s no problem with the showers”, “the girls and the boys 
are strictly separated”, being forced to stand up, all by yourself, that’s much worse than the 
veiling debate. I pity the girl. First, you can see all her joy, her expectations for the camp school, 
and then her disappointment, when she’s not allowed to join.  
  
According to those narratives, it happens now and then that the interests and preferences between 
migrant and/or Muslim parents and children differ. The parents want to exempt their children from 
certain activities, notably camp schools, physical education or instructions in swimming, while the 
children wants to take part in it – and, as illustrated above – do suffer if they’re not allowed to take 
part. In other examples, it is narrated how the children are secretive of the activities at schools, for 
example when it comes to sex education, for example actively hiding text books, in order not to be 
exempted. Thus, it is both hypothesised and depicted that there is a cleavage between the parental 
generation and their children, suggesting that they have diverging preferences, interests and – maybe – 
perspectives regarding the significance of religion.  
Calling attention to this cleavage is central when giving priority to the rights of the child over the 
freedom of religion. This order of argument was employed by Sarah, for example, when she described 
the values of the STU, which, according to her, were overlapping with the values of most Swedes. 
You “have to be careful about children and which path they choose”, she stated, and “which religion 
they choose, and which general path they choose”. In order to safeguard the interests of the children, 
you “have to pinion the power of the parents, because, in a way, their power is total”, she continued. 
The parents have the possibility to indoctrinate the child, Sarah stated, and also – if they choose to 
educate it at home – “to isolate it from impressions of the outside world”. Indoctrination is entirely 
different from the purpose with schooling, she notes; the school should be broad, in the way that the 
teaching activities represent the diversity and the possibilities of the society, a striving which can be 
“discerned in the fact that instructions in religion has replaces Christianity as a school subject”. In 
this framing, the primary socialisation of the children in the family is represented in terms of 
indoctrination and the execution of power, and almost regarded as potential hazard, while the 
secondary socialization at the educational institutions safeguards the freedom of choice and the rights 
of the child.  
Summary  
A number of objections to the practice of wearing Burqa or Niqab are put forth by our interviewees. In 
contrast to the media debate, the argument of gender equality was relatively downgraded. Rather, the 
interviewees focused on assumed problems with identification and communication. It was said that the 
abovementioned veiling practices obstructed the possibility of identifying the students at school, and 
also rendered the communication – and hence the instructions – at school more difficult. In 
comparison with the question of Islamic denominational schools, the non-tolerant stance was more 
manifest, although few explicit calls for a prohibition were made. Moreover, a specific discursive 
framing of the veiling practices could be discerned. The wearing of Burqa or Niqab was associated 
with phenomena such as mischief and the hidden, thus casting suspicion over the practice in question.  
As an instance of the everyday life, rather than an institutional arrangement, veiling practices could 
arguably be considered to be of less concern for educational policy than the establishment and 
maintenance of Islamic denominational schools. Still, the question of prohibition has gained a lot 
media attention during the last years, and brought the regulating dimension to the fore. And though our 
material contains few explicit calls for prohibition, several interviewees claimed that a teacher must 
see the face of the student in order to instruct and educate. And although the goal of equivalence was 
less relevant in this matter, the practice of veiling was questioned with reference to universal human 
rights, as the rights of the child. The right of the parent to exert influence in religious matter was 
questioned, since it could be regarded as a limitation of the freedom to choose direction in life - 
religiously and existentially. 
  
(4) Conclusion  
Accept of Islamic belief practices in Sweden 
The general aim of this report was to describe and analyze the embodiment of acceptance and 
recognition in discourses and practices which address cultural diversity in the Swedish educational 
system. In order to fulfil this general aim, we studied how teachers, headmasters, union 
representatives, civil servants and representatives of political parties or the civil society discuss and 
relate to the claims for recognition put forth by Muslim practitioners and/or policy measures designed 
to reach the fulfilment of those claims. Two cases are studied: the establishment of Muslim 
independent schools and the claims to dress veiled in public schools, put forth by Muslim youth. The 
purpose of this study was threefold. First, to describe the general attitudes among teachers, 
headmasters and other categories of professionals with an interest in educational matters towards the 
existence of Islamic denominational schools and the practice of wearing Burqa and/or Niqab in public 
schools; second, to describe which arguments that are employed in the opposition of those phenomena, 
and implicitly or explicitly argue for the closing-down of those schools or a prohibition of the 
abovementioned veiling practices; third, to analyze the ideological and policy-related underpinnings of 
those arguments. 
A number of disadvantages with the establishment of Islamic denominational schools have been 
expressed. They are supposed to be divisive, both culturally and socially, and the quality of their 
instructions is supposed to be inadequate, in relation to the standards explicated in the national 
curriculum and syllabi. If the attitudes found in this study is spread all over Sweden, it could 
reasonable be said that Muslim schools are met by suspicion. Still, few calls for shutting down of these 
schools are voiced. It seems that the Muslim denominational schools are tolerated in a literal sense: it 
is accepted, sometimes out of pragmatically motivated considerations, but not liked. On the other 
hand, it could be said that the provision of a juridical and institutional space for religious minorities to 
establish denominational schools is a part of the politics of recognition; i.e. an educational policy 
which, under auspicious circumstances might provide the means for religious minorities to receive 
respect as equal and gain admission as normal. It must also be noted that the some of the objections to 
the existence of denominational schools implicitly and explicitly related to some central notions in 
Swedish educational policy. The notion of equivalence is a keyword in this context, and signifies on 
the one hand a demand for abidance by the national curriculum and syllabi, and on the other its 
priority over freedom of choice, and also the priority of “demos” over “ethnos”.  
A number of objections to the practice of wearing Burqa or Niqab are also put forth. In contrast to the 
Swedish media debate, arguments based on notions of gender equality were relatively downgraded. 
Rather, the interviewees focused on assumed problems with identification and communication. It was 
said that the abovementioned veiling practices obstructed the possibility of identifying the students at 
school, and also rendered the communication – and hence the instructions – at school more difficult. In 
comparison with the question of Islamic denominational schools, the non-tolerant stance was more 
manifest, although few explicit calls for a prohibition were made. If the attitudes found in this study is 
spread all over Sweden, it could reasonable be said that opposition towards wearing Burqa or Niqab is 
regarded as major obstacle for the enactment of education. Moreover, a specific discursive framing of 
the veiling practices could be discerned in our case study. The wearing of Burqa or Niqab was 
associated with phenomena such as mischief and the hidden, thus casting suspicion over the practice in 
question.  
As an instance of the everyday life, rather than an institutional arrangement, veiling practices could 
arguably be considered to be of less concern for educational policy than the establishment and 
maintenance of Islamic denominational schools. Still, the question of prohibition has gained a lot 
media attention during the last years, and brought the regulating dimension to the fore. And though our 
  
material contains few explicit calls for prohibition, several interviewees claimed that a teacher must 
see the face of the student in order to instruct and educate. And although the goal of equivalence was 
less relevant in this matter, the practice of veiling was questioned with reference to universal human 
rights, as the rights of the child. Thus, it seems like that the right to wear Burqa and Niqab in public 
schools are among the non-tolerable, although few explicit calls for prohibition can be discerned. As 
noted above, the material in our report resonates with the broader tendencies discerned by Mella, Palm 
and Bromark (2011): the resistance in Sweden against the Burqa and the Niqab is manifest.   
If we focus on the most elaborated objections in the report, we find arguments which 1) was presented 
as a response to the presumably universalist claims of freedom of religion, thus setting the professional 
considerations which are presented above in a more general, ethical context, and 2) pointed out an 
ethical value of overriding importance, viz. the rights of the child. Emphasis is laid on the right of the 
child to “choose his own path”, a wording which is used by several interviewees, which most of all 
seems to refer to the first paragraph in article 14 in the United Nations convention on the Rights of the 
Child, which aims at protecting “the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion”. 
In the arguments of the teachers, the headmasters and the union representatives, this ethical principle 
makes it to possible to assert that children to a certain extent has the freedom from the religion (as well 
as from other loyalties, or sets of ideas and beliefs) of the parents. Although not explicitly questioning 
the parents rights’ to raise and guide their own children, they distinctly emphasize the autonomy of the 
child, and it’s potential to choose something else than that which is given within the family. The right 
of the parent to exert influence in religious matter was questioned, since it could be regarded as a 
limitation of the freedom to choose direction to the walk of life. 
The emphasis on the rights of the child is regularly explicated in a specific discursive context. The 
right to “choose one’s own path” is contrasted to the restrictions inherent in the religiosity of the 
parents. Religion is regularly depicted as the repressive force, and the secular mind-set as the entity in 
need of protection. The possibility of secular parents putting down religious inclinations among their 
children is never represented. Evidently, a discursive coupling of religion with repression and 
secularism with liberation may be discerned in the claims for freedom from religion. It may also be 
noted, that the impact from parental (Islamic) faith is the only aspect of upbringing which is 
questioned in this context.  
The notion of “equivalence” is important for the argument outlined above. Equivalence is, as we have 
seen, a key concept in Swedish educational policy, and frequently used in the national curricula. 
According to the national curricula, the education which is at disposal in the national school system 
should be of equal quality and accessibility to everyone. (In the context of official Swedish 
educational policy, the goal of “equivalence” denotes a political compromise, in so that it expresses an 
idea of equality and fairness in a context where freedom of choice also is a recognised and highly 
estimated value.) The interviewees strongly emphasize the importance of the goal of equivalence. In 
their argumentation, it is implied that some crucial articles in the declaration of the UN supports the 
standpoints taken up in the national curricula, thus providing an aura of ethical authority.  
As noted above, the stress on equivalence consists of two distinct although related arguments. On the 
one hand, there is a demand for abidance by the law (here: steering documents such as national 
curriculum and syllabi), which among other things are paid attention to because Islamic schools are 
suspected not follow these steering documents accordingly. This interpretation of “equivalence” is 
related to an understanding of the term which has become more and more frequent since the 
introduction of freedom of choice and independent schools in Swedish educational policy, and the 
decentralized system of governance of education in Sweden (Lindensjö & Lundgren 2002). In this 
context, where regulation is obtained through management by objective and evaluation, and 
responsibilities are spread between numerous responsible organizations, the goal of equivalence is 
equivalent (!) to abidance by the law.  
  
On the other hand, there is wish to maintain socially integrated educational environments, in which 
students from different ethnicities, classes and gender meets and interacts. Thus, it seems like the 
equalizing and integrative objectives which were central to the compulsory school project 
implemented during the heyday of the Scandinavian welfare regime (Esping-Andersen 1990) seem to 
be “alive and kicking”. But the quest for recognition of minority beliefs systems, central to the policy 
of multiculturalism, is circumscribed. In so far, the arguments employed here gives priority to the 
reproduction of “demos” over the reproduction of “ethnos”. It must also be noted that the freedom of 
choice, an important feature in the neoliberal turn of educational policy, does not seems to be so 
important for the interviewees in this particular matter.  
In this report, we have emphasized the connection between on the one hand the attitudes to Islamic 
denominational schools and Islamic practices of complete veiling, and on the other contemporary and 
anterior education policy in Sweden, above all the idea of equivalence in education. As such, we focus 
on a specifically Swedish discourse (albeit the ideas of equality and abidance by the law evidently not 
are exclusively Swedish). Still, it could reasonably be argued that not only national, but also 
transnational discourses affect what is expressed locally. The influence of specific transnational 
discourses, such as e.g. those labelled islamophobic (Gardell 2010), orientalistic (Said 1978) or 
racializing (Zebiri 2008) might also be at play, mixed together with or distinctly separated from 
discourses of secularism or competing religions; the latter might of course also be articulated without 
any influence what so ever from the earlier. Nevertheless, the analytic task to discern the influence of 
islamophobic, orientalistic or racializing discourses in our material would call for a more elaborated 
(and suspicious) hermeneutic than the one employed here. This is not all to say, though, that we find 
those hermeneutic enterprises unnecessary. Rather, on the contrary.  
One of the lessons that could be learned from this report is that the arguments against tolerance or 
recognition of Islamic belief practices might not be primarily be based on islamophobic or orientalistic 
discourses, but rather with reference with notions of equality (although we must remember that 
questions regarding the nature of the relation between these systems of meaning remain unanswered 
here). The stress laid on the professional aspect of the opposition against veiling practices might be of 
importance here: in several cases, the interviewees dissociate themselves from the standpoints put 
forth in media, above all those who solely focus on the gender aspect of complete veiling practices. 
Instead, the emphasis on the professional educator dimension entails a focus on communication and 
identification. In the words of the American folklorists Charles Briggs and Richard Bauman 
(1992:149ff), these acts of discursive positioning might be seen as an effort to “maximize the 
intertextual gap” between their own argument and the discourse in media, which to a fair-sized extent 
was articulated by radical right-wing populists. This dilemma is solved by the rhetoric of equivalence, 
which offers a way to reject claims of recognition in tandem with the defence of values as diverse and 
important as social justice, the rule of law and the freedom of the individual (child). Thus, the non-
tolerance of religiously motivated veiling practices could be motivated with values which is central to 
diverse but culturally dominant ideological universes, such as socialism and (neo-)liberalism.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. List of particpants in the study 
Name Age cohort Occupation 
Alice 35-39 Student at the Teacher education program 
Amy 20-24 Student at the Teacher education program 
Ann  45-49 Teacher, primary school 
David 50-54 Higher representative, National Union of Teachers, teacher on leave 
Elias 25-29 Student at the Teacher education program 
Gertrud 20-24 Student at the Teacher education program 
Ibrahim 60-64 Senior civil servant, responsible for municipal social care 
Irene 40-45 Jurist, formerly employed at the ombudsman against discrmination 
John 45-49 Headmaster, primary school 
Katarina 35-39 Student at the Teacher education program 
Lars 30-34 Political advisor, Liberal party Folkpartiet  
Lena 45-49 Headmaster, primary school 
Linn 25-29 Student at the Teacher education program 
Lizette 25-29 Student at the Teacher education program 
Mahmud 60-64 Imam, the Stockholm Mosque; chairman, Islamic Federation of Sweden 
Martin 30-34 Teacher, upper secondary school 
Marit 25-29 Student at the Teacher education program 
Mehdi 55-59 Headmaster, primary school (Muslim independent school) 
Noomi 20-24 Student at the Teacher education program 
Peter  50-54 Teacher, upper secondary school 
Sarah 55-59 Senior official at the Swedish Teachers Union 
Sylvia 55-59 Senior civil servant, responsible for reception of refugees 
 
 
  
 
